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author | Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> | 2019-11-27 18:48:21 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 2019-11-30 22:52:35 +0100 |
commit | 72b006f4bfd30b7c5037c163efaf279ab65bea9c (patch) | |
tree | 50fdf5a566469f65c1b496efaaee77961775322e /gpg-interface.h | |
parent | gpg-interface: limit search for primary key fingerprint (diff) | |
download | git-72b006f4bfd30b7c5037c163efaf279ab65bea9c.tar.xz git-72b006f4bfd30b7c5037c163efaf279ab65bea9c.zip |
gpg-interface: prefer check_signature() for GPG verification
This commit refactors the use of verify_signed_buffer() outside of
gpg-interface.c to use check_signature() instead. It also turns
verify_signed_buffer() into a file-local function since it's now only
invoked internally by check_signature().
There were previously two globally scoped functions used in different
parts of Git to perform GPG signature verification:
verify_signed_buffer() and check_signature(). Now only
check_signature() is used.
The verify_signed_buffer() function doesn't guard against duplicate
signatures as described by Michał Górny [1]. Instead it only ensures a
non-erroneous exit code from GPG and the presence of at least one
GOODSIG status field. This stands in contrast with check_signature()
that returns an error if more than one signature is encountered.
The lower degree of verification makes the use of verify_signed_buffer()
problematic if callers don't parse and validate the various parts of the
GPG status message themselves. And processing these messages seems like
a task that should be reserved to gpg-interface.c with the function
check_signature().
Furthermore, the use of verify_signed_buffer() makes it difficult to
introduce new functionality that relies on the content of the GPG status
lines.
Now all operations that does signature verification share a single entry
point to gpg-interface.c. This makes it easier to propagate changed or
additional functionality in GPG signature verification to all parts of
Git, without having odd edge-cases that don't perform the same degree of
verification.
[1] https://dev.gentoo.org/~mgorny/articles/attack-on-git-signature-verification.html
Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'gpg-interface.h')
-rw-r--r-- | gpg-interface.h | 9 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/gpg-interface.h b/gpg-interface.h index 3e624ec289..93cc3aff5c 100644 --- a/gpg-interface.h +++ b/gpg-interface.h @@ -46,15 +46,6 @@ size_t parse_signature(const char *buf, size_t size); int sign_buffer(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *signing_key); -/* - * Run "gpg" to see if the payload matches the detached signature. - * gpg_output, when set, receives the diagnostic output from GPG. - * gpg_status, when set, receives the status output from GPG. - */ -int verify_signed_buffer(const char *payload, size_t payload_size, - const char *signature, size_t signature_size, - struct strbuf *gpg_output, struct strbuf *gpg_status); - int git_gpg_config(const char *, const char *, void *); void set_signing_key(const char *); const char *get_signing_key(void); |