| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This will allow tests to specify an alternative sshd, eg on a remote
machine with different endianness.
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FIDO application IDs for security key-backed keys, to prevent web key handles
from being used remotely as this would likely lead to unpleasant surprises.
By default, only application IDs that start with "ssh:*" are allowed.
This adds a -Owebsafe-allow=... argument that can override the default
list with a more or less restrictive one. The default remains unchanged.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 957c1ed92a8d7c87453b9341f70cb3f4e6b23e8d
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to getgrouplist(3)
Our kernel supports 16 groups (NGROUPS_MAX), but nothing prevents
an admin from adding a user to more groups. With that tweak we'll keep
on ignoring them instead of potentially reading past the buffer passed to
getgrouplist(3). That behavior is explicitely described in initgroups(3).
ok millert@ gilles@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a959fc45ea3431b36f52eda04faefc58bcde00db
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13511fdef7535bdbc35b644c90090013da43a318
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jsg@ feedback/ok deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26d81a430811672bc762687166986cad40d28cc0
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exchange
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a3259a193fd42108a869ebf650b95b5f2d08dcf
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It got broken by the sshd-auth change, it's not obvious why, and the
platform lacks the debugging tools (eg gdb, strace) to figure it out.
The upstream project seems effectively dead (6 years since the last
commit, 10 since the last release). It was useful while it lasted
(we found a real bug because of it) but its time seems to have passed.
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Instead of maintaing state (pipe descriptors, signal handlers) across
pselect-on-select invocations, set up and restore them each call.
This prevents outside factors (eg a closefrom or signal handler
installation) from potentially causing problems. This does result in a
drop in throughput of a couple of percent on geriatric platforms without
a native pselect due to the extra overhead. Tweaks & ok djm@
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ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc673065e6505bb06b2e2b9362f78ccb4200a828
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OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8654b9aa8eb695b1499fffc408c25319592bf0e0
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let's users zap keys without access to $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
ok deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dae9db0516b1011e5ba8c655ac702fce42e6c023
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first character. ok deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3f8be6d32496e5596dd8b14e19cb067ddd7969ef
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... and ssh and sshd log wrappers before recreating them. Prevents "can't
create" errors during tests when running tests without SUDO after having
run them with SUDO.
OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2f0a83532e3dccd673a9bf0291090277268c69a6
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... to run all of the subprograms from the build directory while
developing and debugging. Should help prevent accidentally testing
against unchanged installed sshd-auth and sshd-session binaries. ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61760cdc98c2bc8f1e9f83a6f97cca0f66b52e69
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Prevents problems on platforms where this isn't safe (which it's not
required to be). ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8fa4ce3ad90915c925b81b99a79ab920b0523387
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domain socket paths; GHPR115
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8a34d0a0c51a9ddab3dfce615f9878fa76ef842
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 597ab7dd3f0e78939d2659fc1904d0f39ee95487
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based on GHPR393
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1517763764eb55d03a6092dd120d2909c6fef0e1
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can use the shared one from fatal.c
based on GHPR401 from lengyijun
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8ea75ea99f27f464c9223cbc89cb046ccf9cd5c4
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arranging the hostkey algorithms. AFAIK this code is unused in OpenSSH, but I
guess others are using it
based on GHPR387 from Pawel Jakub Dawidek
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d462495ac0c40f7b7dd66178e0005b9b2128225
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^x' commandline to be exactly two characters long. Avoids one by OOB read if
ssh is invoked as "ssh -e^ ..."
Spotted by Maciej Domanski in GHPR368
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: baa72bc60898fc5639e6c62de7493a202c95823d
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visbility-restrict ones that are unused outside the implementation itself;
based on GHPR#282 by tobias@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0140f2418b4d46cfaa7b33febc0a0931f9b2744
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b3c82655190532b01eb817e532742cfaa4687eff
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Kugler via GHPR501
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f864a34feb5d5ff17160cf7c42ad0f7744fe8a3f
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9a5d3add25e4e77bd3805bc5583a842ecf34d85c
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ok djm@
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Makes builds configured --without-openssl work again since otherwise
the first use of the RNG comes after the sandbox init and it can't
open /dev/random.
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OpenBSD-Regress-ID: df7d18a87b475f70004770f0f4e404adba5f6ab7
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negations
OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 67476baccc60bf1a255fd4e329ada950047b8b8d
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This splits the user authentication code from the sshd-session
binary into a separate sshd-auth binary. This will be executed by
sshd-session to complete the user authentication phase of the
protocol only.
Splitting this code into a separate binary ensures that the crucial
pre-authentication attack surface has an entirely disjoint address
space from the code used for the rest of the connection. It also
yields a small runtime memory saving as the authentication code will
be unloaded after thhe authentication phase completes.
Joint work with markus@ feedback deraadt@
Tested in snaps since last week
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c3b2087ae08626ec31b4177b023db600e986d9c
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there has been traffic on a X11 forwarding channel recently.
Should fix X11 forwarding performance problems when this setting is
enabled. Patch from Antonio Larrosa via bz3655
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 820284a92eb4592fcd3d181a62c1b86b08a4a7ab
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fdd056e7854294834d54632b4282b877cfe4c12e
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exchange in sshd by default. Specifically, this removes the
diffie-hellman-group* and diffie-hellman-group-exchange-* methods. The client
is unchanged and continues to support these methods by default.
Finite field Diffie Hellman is slow and computationally expensive for
the same security level as Elliptic Curve DH or PQ key agreement while
offering no redeeming advantages.
ECDH has been specified for the SSH protocol for 15 years and some
form of ECDH has been the default key exchange in OpenSSH for the last
14 years.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e238ad480a33312667cc10ae0eb6393abaec8da
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negated Matches; spotted by phessler@ ok deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b1c6acec66cd5bd1252feff1d02ad7129ced37c7
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