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* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 23:20:00Damien Miller2014-01-101-33/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | [digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c] [kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c] [kexgexs.c key.c key.h roaming_client.c roaming_common.c schnorr.c] [schnorr.h ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect2.c] Introduce digest API and use it to perform all hashing operations rather than calling OpenSSL EVP_Digest* directly. Will make it easier to build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in future; feedback, ok markus@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 00:39:15Damien Miller2013-11-081-2/+2
| | | | | | | [auth-options.c auth2-chall.c authfd.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c] [clientloop.c gss-genr.c monitor_mm.c packet.c schnorr.c umac.c] [sftp-client.c sftp-glob.c] use calloc for all structure allocations; from markus@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 00:13:13Darren Tucker2013-06-011-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [xmalloc.h cipher.c sftp-glob.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sftp-common.c ssh-ecdsa.c auth2-chall.c compat.c readconf.c kexgexs.c monitor.c gss-genr.c cipher-3des1.c kex.c monitor_wrap.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c auth-options.c rsa.c auth2-pubkey.c sftp.c hostfile.c auth2.c servconf.c auth.c authfile.c xmalloc.c uuencode.c sftp-client.c auth2-gss.c sftp-server.c bufaux.c mac.c session.c jpake.c kexgexc.c sshconnect.c auth-chall.c auth2-passwd.c sshconnect1.c buffer.c kexecdhs.c kexdhs.c ssh-rsa.c auth1.c ssh-pkcs11.c auth2-kbdint.c kexdhc.c sshd.c umac.c ssh-dss.c auth2-jpake.c bufbn.c clientloop.c monitor_mm.c scp.c roaming_client.c serverloop.c key.c auth-rsa.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-keygen.c match.c channels.c sshconnect2.c addrmatch.c mux.c canohost.c kexecdhc.c schnorr.c ssh-add.c misc.c auth2-hostbased.c ssh-agent.c bufec.c groupaccess.c dns.c packet.c readpass.c authfd.c moduli.c] bye, bye xfree(); ok markus@
* - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 09:08:41Darren Tucker2013-05-161-5/+7
| | | | | | [log.c scp.c sshd.c serverloop.c schnorr.c sftp.c] Fix some "unused result" warnings found via clang and -portable. ok markus@
* - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS SyncDarren Tucker2010-12-041-6/+24
| | | | | | | | - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/12/03 23:49:26 [schnorr.c] check that g^x^q === 1 mod p; recommended by JPAKE author Feng Hao (this code is still disabled, but apprently people are treating it as a reference implementation)
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/09/20 04:50:53Damien Miller2010-09-241-1/+9
| | | | | | | [jpake.c schnorr.c] check that received values are smaller than the group size in the disabled and unfinished J-PAKE code. avoids catastrophic security failure found by Sebastien Martini
* - (dtucker) [schnorr.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}] AddDarren Tucker2009-03-071-0/+2
| | | | | EVP_DigestUpdate to the OLD_EVP compatibility functions and tell schnorr.c to use them. Allows building with older OpenSSL versions.
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/05 07:18:19Damien Miller2009-03-051-68/+306
| | | | | | | [auth2-jpake.c jpake.c jpake.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h schnorr.c] [sshconnect2.c] refactor the (disabled) Schnorr proof code to make it a little more generally useful
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/18 04:31:21Damien Miller2009-02-211-2/+4
| | | | | | [schnorr.c] signature should hash over the entire group, not just the generator (this is still disabled code)
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/04 08:22:13Damien Miller2008-11-051-0/+407
[auth.h auth2.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h] [readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h ssh_config.5] [sshconnect2.c sshd_config.5 jpake.c jpake.h schnorr.c auth2-jpake.c] [Makefile.in] Add support for an experimental zero-knowledge password authentication method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008. This method allows password-based authentication without exposing the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint. This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc). "just commit it. It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@