utf8: fix overflow when returning string width

The return type of both `utf8_strwidth()` and `utf8_strnwidth()` is
`int`, but we operate on string lengths which are typically of type
`size_t`. This means that when the string is longer than `INT_MAX`, we
will overflow and thus return a negative result.

This can lead to an out-of-bounds write with `--pretty=format:%<1)%B`
and a commit message that is 2^31+1 bytes long:

    =================================================================
    ==26009==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000001168 at pc 0x7f95c4e5f427 bp 0x7ffd8541c900 sp 0x7ffd8541c0a8
    WRITE of size 2147483649 at 0x603000001168 thread T0
        #0 0x7f95c4e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827
        #1 0x5612bbb1068c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1763
        #2 0x5612bbb1087a in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
        #3 0x5612bbc33bab in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
        #4 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
        #5 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
        #6 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781
        #7 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
        #8 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
        #9 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
        #10 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
        #11 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #12 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #13 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788
        #14 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
        #15 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57
        #16 0x7f95c4c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
        #17 0x7f95c4c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
        #18 0x5612bb5680e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115

    0x603000001168 is located 0 bytes to the right of 24-byte region [0x603000001150,0x603000001168)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7f95c4ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85
        #1 0x5612bbcdd556 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136
        #2 0x5612bbc310a3 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99
        #3 0x5612bbc32acd in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298
        #4 0x5612bbc33aec in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418
        #5 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
        #6 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
        #7 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781
        #8 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
        #9 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
        #10 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
        #11 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
        #12 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #13 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #14 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788
        #15 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
        #16 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57
        #17 0x7f95c4c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)

    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy
    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
      0x0c067fff81d0: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa
      0x0c067fff81e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd
      0x0c067fff81f0: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff8200: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa
      0x0c067fff8210: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd
    =>0x0c067fff8220: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00[fa]fa fa
      0x0c067fff8230: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff8240: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff8250: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff8260: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff8270: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
      Addressable:           00
      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
      Heap left redzone:       fa
      Freed heap region:       fd
      Stack left redzone:      f1
      Stack mid redzone:       f2
      Stack right redzone:     f3
      Stack after return:      f5
      Stack use after scope:   f8
      Global redzone:          f9
      Global init order:       f6
      Poisoned by user:        f7
      Container overflow:      fc
      Array cookie:            ac
      Intra object redzone:    bb
      ASan internal:           fe
      Left alloca redzone:     ca
      Right alloca redzone:    cb
    ==26009==ABORTING

Now the proper fix for this would be to convert both functions to return
an `size_t` instead of an `int`. But given that this commit may be part
of a security release, let's instead do the minimal viable fix and die
in case we see an overflow.

Add a test that would have previously caused us to crash.

Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

2 files changed, 17 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
index e3905baa3c..aac9e4ce6c 100755
--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
@@ -922,4 +922,12 @@ test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit mes
 	test_cmp expect actual
 '
 
+test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message does not cause allocation failure' '
+	test_must_fail git log -1 --format="%<(1)%B" $huge_commit 2>error &&
+	cat >expect <<-EOF &&
+	fatal: number too large to represent as int on this platform: 2147483649
+	EOF
+	test_cmp expect error
+'
+
 test_done
diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c
index 6a21fd6a7b..30c7787cfa 100644
--- a/utf8.c
+++ b/utf8.c
@@ -208,11 +208,12 @@ int utf8_width(const char **start, size_t *remainder_p)
  */
 int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, size_t len, int skip_ansi)
 {
-	int width = 0;
 	const char *orig = string;
+	size_t width = 0;
 
 	while (string && string < orig + len) {
-		int glyph_width, skip;
+		int glyph_width;
+		size_t skip;
 
 		while (skip_ansi &&
 		       (skip = display_mode_esc_sequence_len(string)) != 0)
@@ -222,7 +223,12 @@ int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, size_t len, int skip_ansi)
 		if (glyph_width > 0)
 			width += glyph_width;
 	}
-	return string ? width : len;
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: fix the interface of this function and `utf8_strwidth()` to
+	 * return `size_t` instead of `int`.
+	 */
+	return cast_size_t_to_int(string ? width : len);
 }
 
 int utf8_strwidth(const char *string)