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author | Repo Admin <nobody@gnupg.org> | 2002-10-19 09:55:27 +0200 |
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committer | Repo Admin <nobody@gnupg.org> | 2002-10-19 09:55:27 +0200 |
commit | 82a17c9fb3d64ccdd474c3bedf564368f77e84a4 (patch) | |
tree | 0c01ee8cea5f6f77e830955c6b97024752740a2b /g10/seckey-cert.c | |
parent | Bumped version number for cvs version (diff) | |
download | gnupg2-82a17c9fb3d64ccdd474c3bedf564368f77e84a4.tar.xz gnupg2-82a17c9fb3d64ccdd474c3bedf564368f77e84a4.zip |
This commit was manufactured by cvs2svn to create branch
'GNUPG-1-9-BRANCH'.
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/seckey-cert.c')
-rw-r--r-- | g10/seckey-cert.c | 382 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 382 deletions
diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c deleted file mode 100644 index d19ac683a..000000000 --- a/g10/seckey-cert.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,382 +0,0 @@ -/* seckey-cert.c - secret key certificate packet handling - * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc. - * - * This file is part of GnuPG. - * - * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software - * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA - */ - -#include <config.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <stdlib.h> -#include <string.h> -#include <assert.h> -#include "util.h" -#include "memory.h" -#include "packet.h" -#include "mpi.h" -#include "keydb.h" -#include "cipher.h" -#include "main.h" -#include "options.h" -#include "i18n.h" -#include "status.h" - - -static int -do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text ) -{ - byte *buffer; - u16 csum=0; - int i, res; - unsigned nbytes; - - if( sk->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */ - DEK *dek = NULL; - u32 keyid[4]; /* 4! because we need two of them */ - CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd=NULL; - PKT_secret_key *save_sk; - - if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) { - log_info(_("secret key parts are not available\n")); - return G10ERR_GENERAL; - } - if( sk->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_NONE ) - BUG(); - if( check_cipher_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) { - log_info(_("protection algorithm %d%s is not supported\n"), - sk->protect.algo,sk->protect.algo==1?" (IDEA)":"" ); - if(sk->protect.algo==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) - idea_cipher_warn(0); - return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; - } - keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid ); - keyid[2] = keyid[3] = 0; - if( !sk->is_primary ) { - keyid[2] = sk->main_keyid[0]; - keyid[3] = sk->main_keyid[1]; - } - dek = passphrase_to_dek( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo, sk->protect.algo, - &sk->protect.s2k, 0, tryagain_text ); - cipher_hd = cipher_open( sk->protect.algo, - CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1); - cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ); - m_free(dek); - save_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk ); - cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen ); - csum = 0; - if( sk->version >= 4 ) { - int ndata; - byte *p, *data; - u16 csumc = 0; - - i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo); - assert( mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) ); - p = mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndata ); - if ( ndata > 1 ) - csumc = p[ndata-2] << 8 | p[ndata-1]; - data = m_alloc_secure( ndata ); - cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, data, p, ndata ); - mpi_free( sk->skey[i] ); sk->skey[i] = NULL ; - p = data; - if (sk->protect.sha1chk) { - /* This is the new SHA1 checksum method to detect - tampering with the key as used by the Klima/Rosa - attack */ - sk->csum = 0; - csum = 1; - if( ndata < 20 ) - log_error("not enough bytes for SHA-1 checksum\n"); - else { - MD_HANDLE h = md_open (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1); - if (!h) - BUG(); /* algo not available */ - md_write (h, data, ndata - 20); - md_final (h); - if (!memcmp (md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1), - data + ndata - 20, 20) ) { - /* digest does match. We have to keep the old - style checksum in sk->csum, so that the - test used for unprotected keys does work. - This test gets used when we are adding new - keys. */ - sk->csum = csum = checksum (data, ndata-20); - } - md_close (h); - } - } - else { - if( ndata < 2 ) { - log_error("not enough bytes for checksum\n"); - sk->csum = 0; - csum = 1; - } - else { - csum = checksum( data, ndata-2); - sk->csum = data[ndata-2] << 8 | data[ndata-1]; - if ( sk->csum != csum ) { - /* This is a PGP 7.0.0 workaround */ - sk->csum = csumc; /* take the encrypted one */ - } - } - } - - /* must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail - because the length may have an arbitrary value */ - if( sk->csum == csum ) { - for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) { - nbytes = ndata; - sk->skey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(p, &nbytes, 1 ); - ndata -= nbytes; - p += nbytes; - } - /* Note: at this point ndata should be 2 for a simple - checksum or 20 for the sha1 digest */ - } - m_free(data); - } - else { - for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo); - i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) { - byte *p; - int ndata; - unsigned int dummy; - - assert (mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i])); - p = mpi_get_opaque (sk->skey[i], &ndata); - assert (ndata >= 2); - assert (ndata == ((p[0] << 8 | p[1]) + 7)/8 + 2); - buffer = m_alloc_secure (ndata); - cipher_sync (cipher_hd); - buffer[0] = p[0]; - buffer[1] = p[1]; - cipher_decrypt (cipher_hd, buffer+2, p+2, ndata-2); - csum += checksum (buffer, ndata); - mpi_free (sk->skey[i]); - dummy = ndata; - sk->skey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer (buffer, &dummy, 1); - assert (sk->skey[i]); - m_free (buffer); -/* csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]); */ - } - } - cipher_close( cipher_hd ); - /* now let's see whether we have used the right passphrase */ - if( csum != sk->csum ) { - copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk ); - passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo ); - free_secret_key( save_sk ); - return G10ERR_BAD_PASS; - } - /* the checksum may fail, so we also check the key itself */ - res = pubkey_check_secret_key( sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey ); - if( res ) { - copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk ); - passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo ); - free_secret_key( save_sk ); - return G10ERR_BAD_PASS; - } - free_secret_key( save_sk ); - sk->is_protected = 0; - } - else { /* not protected, assume it is okay if the checksum is okay */ - csum = 0; - for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo); - i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) { - csum += checksum_mpi( sk->skey[i] ); - } - if( csum != sk->csum ) - return G10ERR_CHECKSUM; - } - - return 0; -} - - - -/**************** - * Check the secret key - * Ask up to 3 (or n) times for a correct passphrase - */ -int -check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n ) -{ - int rc = G10ERR_BAD_PASS; - int i; - - if( n < 1 ) - n = (opt.batch && !opt.use_agent)? 1 : 3; /* use the default value */ - - for(i=0; i < n && rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS; i++ ) { - const char *tryagain = NULL; - if (i) { - tryagain = _("Invalid passphrase; please try again"); - log_info (_("%s ...\n"), tryagain); - } - rc = do_check( sk, tryagain ); - if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS && is_status_enabled() ) { - u32 kid[2]; - char buf[50]; - - keyid_from_sk( sk, kid ); - sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX", (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1]); - write_status_text( STATUS_BAD_PASSPHRASE, buf ); - } - if( have_static_passphrase() ) - break; - } - - if( !rc ) - write_status( STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE ); - - return rc; -} - -/**************** - * check whether the secret key is protected. - * Returns: 0 not protected, -1 on error or the protection algorithm - */ -int -is_secret_key_protected( PKT_secret_key *sk ) -{ - return sk->is_protected? sk->protect.algo : 0; -} - - - -/**************** - * Protect the secret key with the passphrase from DEK - */ -int -protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek ) -{ - int i,j, rc = 0; - byte *buffer; - unsigned nbytes; - u16 csum; - - if( !dek ) - return 0; - - if( !sk->is_protected ) { /* okay, apply the protection */ - CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd=NULL; - - if( check_cipher_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) - rc = G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; /* unsupport protection algorithm */ - else { - print_cipher_algo_note( sk->protect.algo ); - cipher_hd = cipher_open( sk->protect.algo, - CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1 ); - if( cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ) ) - log_info(_("WARNING: Weak key detected" - " - please change passphrase again.\n")); - sk->protect.ivlen = cipher_get_blocksize( sk->protect.algo ); - assert( sk->protect.ivlen <= DIM(sk->protect.iv) ); - if( sk->protect.ivlen != 8 && sk->protect.ivlen != 16 ) - BUG(); /* yes, we are very careful */ - randomize_buffer(sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen, 1); - cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen ); - if( sk->version >= 4 ) { - byte *bufarr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY]; - unsigned narr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY]; - unsigned nbits[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY]; - int ndata=0; - byte *p, *data; - - for(j=0, i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo); - i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++, j++ ) { - assert( !mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) ); - bufarr[j] = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[i], &narr[j], NULL ); - nbits[j] = mpi_get_nbits( sk->skey[i] ); - ndata += narr[j] + 2; - } - for( ; j < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY; j++ ) - bufarr[j] = NULL; - ndata += opt.simple_sk_checksum? 2 : 20; /* for checksum */ - - data = m_alloc_secure( ndata ); - p = data; - for(j=0; j < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY && bufarr[j]; j++ ) { - p[0] = nbits[j] >> 8 ; - p[1] = nbits[j]; - p += 2; - memcpy(p, bufarr[j], narr[j] ); - p += narr[j]; - m_free(bufarr[j]); - } - - if (opt.simple_sk_checksum) { - log_info (_("generating the deprecated 16-bit checksum" - " for secret key protection\n")); - csum = checksum( data, ndata-2); - sk->csum = csum; - *p++ = csum >> 8; - *p++ = csum; - sk->protect.sha1chk = 0; - } - else { - MD_HANDLE h = md_open (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1); - if (!h) - BUG(); /* algo not available */ - md_write (h, data, ndata - 20); - md_final (h); - memcpy (p, md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1), 20); - p += 20; - md_close (h); - sk->csum = csum = 0; - sk->protect.sha1chk = 1; - } - assert( p == data+ndata ); - - cipher_encrypt( cipher_hd, data, data, ndata ); - for(i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo); - i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) { - mpi_free( sk->skey[i] ); - sk->skey[i] = NULL; - } - i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo); - sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL, data, ndata ); - } - else { - csum = 0; - for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo); - i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) { - byte *data; - unsigned int nbits; - - csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]); - buffer = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[i], &nbytes, NULL ); - cipher_sync (cipher_hd); - assert ( !mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i]) ); - data = m_alloc (nbytes+2); - nbits = mpi_get_nbits (sk->skey[i]); - assert (nbytes == (nbits + 7)/8); - data[0] = nbits >> 8; - data[1] = nbits; - cipher_encrypt (cipher_hd, data+2, buffer, nbytes); - m_free( buffer ); - - mpi_free (sk->skey[i]); - sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque (NULL, data, nbytes+2); - } - sk->csum = csum; - } - sk->is_protected = 1; - cipher_close( cipher_hd ); - } - } - return rc; -} - |