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authorRepo Admin <nobody@gnupg.org>2002-10-19 09:55:27 +0200
committerRepo Admin <nobody@gnupg.org>2002-10-19 09:55:27 +0200
commit82a17c9fb3d64ccdd474c3bedf564368f77e84a4 (patch)
tree0c01ee8cea5f6f77e830955c6b97024752740a2b /g10/seckey-cert.c
parentBumped version number for cvs version (diff)
downloadgnupg2-82a17c9fb3d64ccdd474c3bedf564368f77e84a4.tar.xz
gnupg2-82a17c9fb3d64ccdd474c3bedf564368f77e84a4.zip
This commit was manufactured by cvs2svn to create branch
'GNUPG-1-9-BRANCH'.
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/seckey-cert.c')
-rw-r--r--g10/seckey-cert.c382
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 382 deletions
diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c
deleted file mode 100644
index d19ac683a..000000000
--- a/g10/seckey-cert.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,382 +0,0 @@
-/* seckey-cert.c - secret key certificate packet handling
- * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
- *
- * This file is part of GnuPG.
- *
- * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
- * (at your option) any later version.
- *
- * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
- * GNU General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
- */
-
-#include <config.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include "util.h"
-#include "memory.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "mpi.h"
-#include "keydb.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "main.h"
-#include "options.h"
-#include "i18n.h"
-#include "status.h"
-
-
-static int
-do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text )
-{
- byte *buffer;
- u16 csum=0;
- int i, res;
- unsigned nbytes;
-
- if( sk->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
- DEK *dek = NULL;
- u32 keyid[4]; /* 4! because we need two of them */
- CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd=NULL;
- PKT_secret_key *save_sk;
-
- if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
- log_info(_("secret key parts are not available\n"));
- return G10ERR_GENERAL;
- }
- if( sk->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_NONE )
- BUG();
- if( check_cipher_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) {
- log_info(_("protection algorithm %d%s is not supported\n"),
- sk->protect.algo,sk->protect.algo==1?" (IDEA)":"" );
- if(sk->protect.algo==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)
- idea_cipher_warn(0);
- return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO;
- }
- keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
- keyid[2] = keyid[3] = 0;
- if( !sk->is_primary ) {
- keyid[2] = sk->main_keyid[0];
- keyid[3] = sk->main_keyid[1];
- }
- dek = passphrase_to_dek( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo, sk->protect.algo,
- &sk->protect.s2k, 0, tryagain_text );
- cipher_hd = cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
- CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1);
- cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
- m_free(dek);
- save_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk );
- cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
- csum = 0;
- if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
- int ndata;
- byte *p, *data;
- u16 csumc = 0;
-
- i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
- assert( mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) );
- p = mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndata );
- if ( ndata > 1 )
- csumc = p[ndata-2] << 8 | p[ndata-1];
- data = m_alloc_secure( ndata );
- cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, data, p, ndata );
- mpi_free( sk->skey[i] ); sk->skey[i] = NULL ;
- p = data;
- if (sk->protect.sha1chk) {
- /* This is the new SHA1 checksum method to detect
- tampering with the key as used by the Klima/Rosa
- attack */
- sk->csum = 0;
- csum = 1;
- if( ndata < 20 )
- log_error("not enough bytes for SHA-1 checksum\n");
- else {
- MD_HANDLE h = md_open (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1);
- if (!h)
- BUG(); /* algo not available */
- md_write (h, data, ndata - 20);
- md_final (h);
- if (!memcmp (md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1),
- data + ndata - 20, 20) ) {
- /* digest does match. We have to keep the old
- style checksum in sk->csum, so that the
- test used for unprotected keys does work.
- This test gets used when we are adding new
- keys. */
- sk->csum = csum = checksum (data, ndata-20);
- }
- md_close (h);
- }
- }
- else {
- if( ndata < 2 ) {
- log_error("not enough bytes for checksum\n");
- sk->csum = 0;
- csum = 1;
- }
- else {
- csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
- sk->csum = data[ndata-2] << 8 | data[ndata-1];
- if ( sk->csum != csum ) {
- /* This is a PGP 7.0.0 workaround */
- sk->csum = csumc; /* take the encrypted one */
- }
- }
- }
-
- /* must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail
- because the length may have an arbitrary value */
- if( sk->csum == csum ) {
- for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
- nbytes = ndata;
- sk->skey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(p, &nbytes, 1 );
- ndata -= nbytes;
- p += nbytes;
- }
- /* Note: at this point ndata should be 2 for a simple
- checksum or 20 for the sha1 digest */
- }
- m_free(data);
- }
- else {
- for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
- i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
- byte *p;
- int ndata;
- unsigned int dummy;
-
- assert (mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i]));
- p = mpi_get_opaque (sk->skey[i], &ndata);
- assert (ndata >= 2);
- assert (ndata == ((p[0] << 8 | p[1]) + 7)/8 + 2);
- buffer = m_alloc_secure (ndata);
- cipher_sync (cipher_hd);
- buffer[0] = p[0];
- buffer[1] = p[1];
- cipher_decrypt (cipher_hd, buffer+2, p+2, ndata-2);
- csum += checksum (buffer, ndata);
- mpi_free (sk->skey[i]);
- dummy = ndata;
- sk->skey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer (buffer, &dummy, 1);
- assert (sk->skey[i]);
- m_free (buffer);
-/* csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]); */
- }
- }
- cipher_close( cipher_hd );
- /* now let's see whether we have used the right passphrase */
- if( csum != sk->csum ) {
- copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
- passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo );
- free_secret_key( save_sk );
- return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
- }
- /* the checksum may fail, so we also check the key itself */
- res = pubkey_check_secret_key( sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey );
- if( res ) {
- copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
- passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo );
- free_secret_key( save_sk );
- return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
- }
- free_secret_key( save_sk );
- sk->is_protected = 0;
- }
- else { /* not protected, assume it is okay if the checksum is okay */
- csum = 0;
- for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
- i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
- csum += checksum_mpi( sk->skey[i] );
- }
- if( csum != sk->csum )
- return G10ERR_CHECKSUM;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-
-/****************
- * Check the secret key
- * Ask up to 3 (or n) times for a correct passphrase
- */
-int
-check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n )
-{
- int rc = G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
- int i;
-
- if( n < 1 )
- n = (opt.batch && !opt.use_agent)? 1 : 3; /* use the default value */
-
- for(i=0; i < n && rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS; i++ ) {
- const char *tryagain = NULL;
- if (i) {
- tryagain = _("Invalid passphrase; please try again");
- log_info (_("%s ...\n"), tryagain);
- }
- rc = do_check( sk, tryagain );
- if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS && is_status_enabled() ) {
- u32 kid[2];
- char buf[50];
-
- keyid_from_sk( sk, kid );
- sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX", (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1]);
- write_status_text( STATUS_BAD_PASSPHRASE, buf );
- }
- if( have_static_passphrase() )
- break;
- }
-
- if( !rc )
- write_status( STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE );
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/****************
- * check whether the secret key is protected.
- * Returns: 0 not protected, -1 on error or the protection algorithm
- */
-int
-is_secret_key_protected( PKT_secret_key *sk )
-{
- return sk->is_protected? sk->protect.algo : 0;
-}
-
-
-
-/****************
- * Protect the secret key with the passphrase from DEK
- */
-int
-protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
-{
- int i,j, rc = 0;
- byte *buffer;
- unsigned nbytes;
- u16 csum;
-
- if( !dek )
- return 0;
-
- if( !sk->is_protected ) { /* okay, apply the protection */
- CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd=NULL;
-
- if( check_cipher_algo( sk->protect.algo ) )
- rc = G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; /* unsupport protection algorithm */
- else {
- print_cipher_algo_note( sk->protect.algo );
- cipher_hd = cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
- CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1 );
- if( cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ) )
- log_info(_("WARNING: Weak key detected"
- " - please change passphrase again.\n"));
- sk->protect.ivlen = cipher_get_blocksize( sk->protect.algo );
- assert( sk->protect.ivlen <= DIM(sk->protect.iv) );
- if( sk->protect.ivlen != 8 && sk->protect.ivlen != 16 )
- BUG(); /* yes, we are very careful */
- randomize_buffer(sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen, 1);
- cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
- if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
- byte *bufarr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
- unsigned narr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
- unsigned nbits[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
- int ndata=0;
- byte *p, *data;
-
- for(j=0, i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
- i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++, j++ ) {
- assert( !mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) );
- bufarr[j] = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[i], &narr[j], NULL );
- nbits[j] = mpi_get_nbits( sk->skey[i] );
- ndata += narr[j] + 2;
- }
- for( ; j < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY; j++ )
- bufarr[j] = NULL;
- ndata += opt.simple_sk_checksum? 2 : 20; /* for checksum */
-
- data = m_alloc_secure( ndata );
- p = data;
- for(j=0; j < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY && bufarr[j]; j++ ) {
- p[0] = nbits[j] >> 8 ;
- p[1] = nbits[j];
- p += 2;
- memcpy(p, bufarr[j], narr[j] );
- p += narr[j];
- m_free(bufarr[j]);
- }
-
- if (opt.simple_sk_checksum) {
- log_info (_("generating the deprecated 16-bit checksum"
- " for secret key protection\n"));
- csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
- sk->csum = csum;
- *p++ = csum >> 8;
- *p++ = csum;
- sk->protect.sha1chk = 0;
- }
- else {
- MD_HANDLE h = md_open (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1);
- if (!h)
- BUG(); /* algo not available */
- md_write (h, data, ndata - 20);
- md_final (h);
- memcpy (p, md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1), 20);
- p += 20;
- md_close (h);
- sk->csum = csum = 0;
- sk->protect.sha1chk = 1;
- }
- assert( p == data+ndata );
-
- cipher_encrypt( cipher_hd, data, data, ndata );
- for(i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
- i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
- mpi_free( sk->skey[i] );
- sk->skey[i] = NULL;
- }
- i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
- sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL, data, ndata );
- }
- else {
- csum = 0;
- for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
- i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
- byte *data;
- unsigned int nbits;
-
- csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]);
- buffer = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[i], &nbytes, NULL );
- cipher_sync (cipher_hd);
- assert ( !mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i]) );
- data = m_alloc (nbytes+2);
- nbits = mpi_get_nbits (sk->skey[i]);
- assert (nbytes == (nbits + 7)/8);
- data[0] = nbits >> 8;
- data[1] = nbits;
- cipher_encrypt (cipher_hd, data+2, buffer, nbytes);
- m_free( buffer );
-
- mpi_free (sk->skey[i]);
- sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque (NULL, data, nbytes+2);
- }
- sk->csum = csum;
- }
- sk->is_protected = 1;
- cipher_close( cipher_hd );
- }
- }
- return rc;
-}
-