sm: Fix compliance checking for ECC signature verification.

* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Also consider the
gcrypt vids for ECDSA et al.
(gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Ditto.
* sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Consider the curve.  Print a compliance
notice for a non-compliant key.

* sm/certchain.c (gpgsm_validate_chain): Silence the "switching to
chain model".

2 files changed, 16 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/sm/certchain.c b/sm/certchain.c
index 9813eca8c..cbb6e1127 100644
--- a/sm/certchain.c
+++ b/sm/certchain.c
@@ -2195,7 +2195,8 @@ gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime,
       /* The root CA indicated that the chain model is to be used but
        * we have not yet used it.  Thus do the validation again using
        * the chain model.  */
-      do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("switching to chain model"));
+      if (opt.verbose)
+        do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("switching to chain model"));
       rc = do_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, checktime,
                               r_exptime, listmode, listfp,
                               (flags |= VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL),
diff --git a/sm/verify.c b/sm/verify.c
index 2e40c021f..9f1216f83 100644
--- a/sm/verify.c
+++ b/sm/verify.c
@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ gpgsm_verify (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, int data_fd, estream_t out_fp)
       unsigned int nbits;
       int pkalgo;
       char *pkalgostr = NULL;
+      char *pkcurve = NULL;
       char *pkfpr = NULL;
       unsigned int pkalgoflags, verifyflags;
 
@@ -457,7 +458,7 @@ gpgsm_verify (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, int data_fd, estream_t out_fp)
 
       pkfpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
       pkalgostr = gpgsm_pubkey_algo_string (cert, NULL);
-      pkalgo = gpgsm_get_key_algo_info (cert, &nbits);
+      pkalgo = gpgsm_get_key_algo_info2 (cert, &nbits, &pkcurve);
       /* Remap the ECC algo to the algo we use.  Note that EdDSA has
        * already been mapped.  */
       if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECC)
@@ -513,9 +514,19 @@ gpgsm_verify (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, int data_fd, estream_t out_fp)
           goto next_signer;
         }
 
+      /* Print compliance warning for the key.  */
+      if (!opt.quiet
+          && !gnupg_pk_is_compliant (opt.compliance, pkalgo, pkalgoflags,
+                                     NULL, nbits, pkcurve))
+          {
+            log_info (_("WARNING: This key is not suitable for signing"
+                        " in %s mode\n"),
+                      gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
+          }
+
       /* Check compliance with CO_DE_VS.  */
       if (gnupg_pk_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, pkalgo, pkalgoflags,
-                                 NULL, nbits, NULL)
+                                 NULL, nbits, pkcurve)
           && gnupg_gcrypt_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS)
           && gnupg_digest_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, sigval_hash_algo))
         gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_VERIFICATION_COMPLIANCE_MODE,
@@ -528,7 +539,6 @@ gpgsm_verify (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, int data_fd, estream_t out_fp)
           gpgsm_errors_seen = 1;
         }
 
-
       /* Now we can check the signature.  */
       if (msgdigest)
         { /* Signed attributes are available. */
@@ -715,6 +725,7 @@ gpgsm_verify (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, int data_fd, estream_t out_fp)
       gcry_sexp_release (sigval);
       xfree (msgdigest);
       xfree (pkalgostr);
+      xfree (pkcurve);
       xfree (pkfpr);
       ksba_cert_release (cert);
       cert = NULL;