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* gpg: Don't consider unknown keys as non-compliant while decrypting.Werner Koch2022-09-261-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Change compliance logic. -- For the description of the proplem see https://dev.gnupg.org/T6205#163306 GnuPG-bug-id: 6205
* gpg: Make symmetric + pubkey encryption de-vs compliant.Werner Koch2022-08-021-5/+47
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Make symmetric + pubkey encryption de-vs compliant. * g10/mainproc.c (struct symlist_item): New. (struct mainproc_context): Add field symenc_list. (release_list): Free that list. (proc_symkey_enc): Record infos from symmetric session packet. (proc_encrypted): Check symkey packet algos -- The original check was too strong because it is in fact compliant to encrypt with a symmetric key and and public key. Thus decryption should issue a compliance status. In addition we now check that the cipher algorithms used to symmetrically encrypt the session key are all compliant. This is similar to our check for all public key encrypted session key packets. GnuPG-bug-id: 6119 Fixes-commit: b03fab09e188f7bb10237d4f20455e4026737e4e Backported from 2.2 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Emit an ERROR status as hint for a bad passphrase.Werner Koch2022-04-251-8/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Issue new error code. (proc_encrypted): Ditto. -- This allows GPGME to return a better error message than "bad session key" to the user. Technically we could get run into these errors also in other cases but this more unlikley. For the command line use we don't do anything to not change the expected output of the command line interface. GnuPG-bug-id: 5943
* gpg: Allow decryption of symencr even for non-compliant cipher.Werner Koch2022-03-181-10/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/decrypt-data.c (decrypt_data): Add arg compliance_error. Adjust all callers. Fail on compliance error only in --require-compliance mode. Make sure to return an error if the buffer is missing; actually that should be an assert. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Delay printing of the compliance mode status. Consult the compliance error now returned by decrypt_data. -- The actual case here is that we fail hard if a message has been AEAD encrypted with one AEAD capable key and also with one passphrase. In general the preference system takes care of not using AEAD if one recipient's key does not support it. However, if the sender uses her own AEAD-capable key _and_ a passphrase the message will be AEAD encrypted. This change allows to decrypt that anyway along with a warning message. Note that this does currently not work in 2.3 due to a non-compliant libgcrypt. We will however, backport this to 2.2.
* gpg: New option --require-compliance.Werner Koch2022-03-081-6/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/options.h (opt): Add field flags.require_compliance. * g10/gpg.c (oRequireCompliance): New. (opts): Add --require-compliance. (main): Set option. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Emit error if non de-vs compliant. (check_sig_and_print): Ditto. * g10/encrypt.c (encrypt_crypt): Ditto. -- Note that in the --encrypt and --verify cased other checks may kick in earlier than this new --require-compliance controlled one.
* gpg: Clarify a call of ask_for_detached_datafile.NIIBE Yutaka2022-02-251-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_tree): Call ask_for_detached_datafile with MD2=NULL. -- Here, c->mfx.md2 is always NULL, in fact. But, text-wise (when searching the use of "mfx.md2"), before the change, it used mfx.md2, which is irrelevant in the handling of PKT_ONEPASS_SIG. Note that: One-Pass Signature is not available in PGP2. This fix removes (text-wise) unmatch of the calls of functions hash_datafile_by_fd hash_datafiles, and ask_for_detached_datafile. Fixes-commit: 88a916cdd40e43312ffcde6bb1c157fe1c122f74 Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/mainproc: avoid extra hash contexts when decrypting MDC inputJussi Kivilinna2022-02-081-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (mainproc_context): New member 'seen_pkt_encrypted_mdc'. (release_list): Clear 'seen_pkt_encrypted_mdc'. (proc_encrypted): Set 'seen_pkt_encrypted_mdc'. (have_seen_pkt_encrypted_aead): Rename to... (have_seen_pkt_encrypted_aead_or_mdc): ...this and add check for 'seen_pkt_encrypted_mdc'. (proc_plaintext): Do not enable extra hash contexts when decrypting MDC input. -- Avoiding extra hash contexts speeds up CFB/MDC decryption quite a lot. For example, decrypting symmetric-key AES-256 encrypted 4 GiB file from RAM to /dev/null sees ~3.4x speed increase on AMD Ryzen 5800X: AES256.CFB encryption: 783 MB/s AES256.CFB decryption: 386 MB/s (before) AES256.CFB encryption: 1.3 GB/s (after patch) Note, AEAD is still significantly faster: AES256.OCB encryption: 2.2 GB/s AES256.OCB decryption: 3.0 GB/s GnuPG-bug-id: T5820 Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
* gpg: Report the status of NO_SECKEY for decryption.NIIBE Yutaka2021-08-241-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Fix the condition to report NO_SECKEY even when the key was not considered by get_session_key. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 5562 Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* gpg: Use a more descriptive prompt for symmetric decryption.Werner Koch2021-05-171-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/keydb.h (GETPASSWORD_FLAG_SYMDECRYPT): New. (passphrase_to_dek_ext): Remove this obsolete prototype. * g10/passphrase.c (passphrase_get): Add arg flags. Use new flag value. (passphrase_to_dek): Add arg flags and pass it on. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Use new flag. * sm/decrypt.c (pwri_decrypt): Use "passphrase". -- Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> (cherry picked from commit 03f83bcda5d1f8d8246bcc1afc603b7f74d0626b) Note that we keep on using the term "passphrase" although "password" would be better. There are however so many occurance of this and given it is a bike shedding topic we fix that in the PO files. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Lookup a missing public key of the current card via LDAP.Werner Koch2021-04-161-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/getkey.c (get_seckey_default_or_card): Lookup a missing public key from the current card via LDAP. * g10/call-dirmngr.c: Include keyserver-intetnal.h. (gpg_dirmngr_ks_get): Rename arg quick into flags. Take care of the new LDAP flag. * g10/keyserver-internal.h (KEYSERVER_IMPORT_FLAG_QUICK): New. Replace the use of the value 1 for the former quick arg. (KEYSERVER_IMPORT_FLAG_LDAP): New. * g10/keyserver.c (keyserver_get_chunk): Increase the reserved line length. * dirmngr/ks-action.c (ks_action_get): Add arg ldap_only. * dirmngr/server.c (cmd_ks_get): Add option --ldap. -- This change makes it easy to start working with gnupg: Just insert the smartcard or token provided to you and the first time you sign a message the public key associated with the current card will be imported and everything is set without any configuration. This works only with an LDAP directory because it can be expected that the public key has been put into the LDAP during card personalization. Of course an LDAP server needs to be configured; in a Windows AD domain this can be a mere "keyserver ldap:///" in dirmngr.conf. Other configured keyservers are ignored. Requirements for the card driver: The $SIGNKEYID attribute must exists and a query for the KEY-FPR attribute needs to return the OpenPGP fingerprint for that key. This is currently supported for OpenPGP cards and certain PKCS#15 cards. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Remove support for PKA.Werner Koch2021-02-021-117/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/gpg.c (oPrintPKARecords): Remove. (opts): Remove --print-pka-records. (main): Remove "pka-lookups","pka-trust-increase" and other PKA stuff. * g10/options.h (EXPORT_DANE_FORMAT): Remove. (VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS, VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE): Remove. (KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD): Remove. * g10/packet.h (pka_info_t): Remove. (PKT_signature): Remove flags.pka_tried and pka_info. * g10/parse-packet.c (register_known_notation): Remove "pka-address@gnupg.org". * g10/pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Remove PKA stuff. * g10/call-dirmngr.c (gpg_dirmngr_get_pka): Remove. * g10/export.c (parse_export_options): Remove "export-pka". (do_export): Adjust for this. (write_keyblock_to_output): Ditto. (do_export_stream): Ditto. (print_pka_or_dane_records): Rename to ... (print_dane_records): this and remove two args. Remove PKA printing. * g10/free-packet.c (free_seckey_enc, cp_pka_info): Adjust for removed pka_info field. * g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname): Make AKL_PKA a dummy. * g10/keyserver.c: Remove "honor-pka-record". (keyserver_import_pka): Remove. * g10/mainproc.c (get_pka_address): Remove. (pka_uri_from_sig): Remove. (check_sig_and_print): Remove code for PKA. -- PKA (Public Key Association) was a DNS based key discovery method which looked up fingerprint by mail addresses in the DNS. This goes back to the conference where DKIM was suggested to show that we already had a better method for this available with PGP/MIME. PKA was was later superseded by an experimental DANE method and is today not anymore relevant. It is anyway doubtful whether PKA was ever widely used. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* Include the library version in the compliance checks.Werner Koch2021-01-281-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * common/compliance.c (gnupg_gcrypt_is_compliant): New. (gnupg_rng_is_compliant): Also check library version. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Use new function. (check_sig_and_print): Ditto. * sm/decrypt.c (gpgsm_decrypt): Ditto. * sm/encrypt.c (gpgsm_encrypt): Ditto. * sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Ditto -- This will eventually allow us to declare Libgcrypt 1.9 to be de-vs compliant. GnuPG can use this information then for its own checks. As of now GnuPG tests the version of the used library but that is a bit cumbersome to maintain. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Fix ugly error message for an unknown symkey algorithm.Werner Koch2021-01-271-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Do not continue with an unknown algorithm. -- Trying to encrypt data created with printf "\x8c\x49\x05\x0e\x0a\x03\x01" fails in version 2.2.19 with gpg: packet(3) with unknown version 5 but with later versions with gpg: encrypted with unknown algorithm 14 gpg: Ohhhh jeeee: ... this is a bug \ ([...]/passphrase.c:433:passphrase_to_dek) so we better catch this case earlier. Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* sm: Exclude rsaPSS from de-vs compliance mode.Werner Koch2020-07-031-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * common/compliance.h (PK_ALGO_FLAG_RSAPSS): New. * common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Add arg alog_flags and test rsaPSS. Adjust all callers. (gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Ditto. * sm/misc.c (gpgsm_ksba_cms_get_sig_val): New wrapper function. (gpgsm_get_hash_algo_from_sigval): New. * sm/certcheck.c (gpgsm_check_cms_signature): Change type of sigval arg. Add arg pkalgoflags. Use the PK_ALGO_FLAG_RSAPSS. * sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Use the new wrapper and new fucntion to also get the algo flags. Pass algo flags along. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: If possible TRUST values now depend on signer's UID or --sender.Werner Koch2020-06-081-7/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Add failsafe check for PK. Pass KEYBLOCK down do check_signatures_trust. Protect existsing error ocde in case the signature expired. * g10/pkclist.c (is_in_sender_list): New. (check_signatures_trust): Add args keyblock and pk. Add new uid based checking code. * g10/test-stubs.c, g10/gpgv.c: Adjust stubs. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 4735 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* doc: Minor code comment fixes.Werner Koch2020-06-081-1/+1
| | | | --
* indent: Some typo and indentation changes for gpg.Werner Koch2020-04-151-1/+1
| | | | --
* gpg: New option --auto-key-importWerner Koch2020-03-141-7/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/gpg.c (opts): New options --auto-key-import, --no-auto-key-import, and --no-include-key-block. (gpgconf_list): Add them. * g10/options.h (opt): Add field flags.auto_key_import. * g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Use flag to enable that feature. * tools/gpgconf-comp.c: Give the new options a Basic config level. -- Note that the --no variants of the options are intended for easy disabling at the command line. GnuPG-bug-id: 4856 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Make use of the included key block in a signature.Werner Koch2020-03-131-9/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/import.c (read_key_from_file): Rename to ... (read_key_from_file_or_buffer): this and add new parameters. Adjust callers. (import_included_key_block): New. * g10/packet.h (PKT_signature): Add field flags.key_block. * g10/parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Set that flags. * g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Add parm forced_pk and change all callers. * g10/mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Ditto. (check_sig_and_print): Try the included key block if no key is available. -- This is is the second part to support the new Key Block subpacket. The idea is that after having received a signed mail, it is instantly possible to reply encrypted - without the need for any centralized infrastructure. There is one case where this does not work: A signed mail is received using a specified signer ID (e.g. using gpg --sender option) and the key block with only that user ID is thus imported. The next time a mail is received using the same key but with a different user ID; the signatures checks out using the key imported the last time. However, the new user id is not imported. Now when trying to reply to that last mail, no key will be found. We need to see whether we can update a key in such a case. GnuPG-bug-id: 4856 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Rework the signature subpacket iteration function.Werner Koch2019-09-051-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/parse-packet.c (enum_sig_subpkt): Replace first arg by two args so that the entire signature packet is available. Change all callers. (parse_sig_subpkt): Ditto. -- This patch is a prerequisite to support the new attestation key signatures. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Don't report NO_SECKEY for valid key.NIIBE Yutaka2019-08-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Report status of STATUS_NO_SECKEY only when some error occurred. -- Fixes-commit: 6cc4119ec03be61c78189a0bec99372035289b91 Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* gpg: More check for symmetric key encryption.NIIBE Yutaka2019-07-181-1/+2
| | | | | | | * g10/dek.h (DEK): Use debugger friendly type of unsigned int. * g10/mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_seskey): Add another check. Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* gpg: Don't try decryption by session key when NULL.NIIBE Yutaka2019-07-121-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Only call get_session_key when PKENC_LIST is not NULL. Return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY, instead of GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY, when it's encrypted only by symmetric key. Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* gpg: With --auto-key-retrieve prefer WKD over keyservers.Werner Koch2019-07-051-52/+64
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print a hint on how to make use of the preferred keyserver. Remove keyserver lookup just by the keyid. Try a WKD lookup before a keyserver lookup. -- The use of the the keyid for lookups does not make much sense anymore since for quite some time we do have the fingerprint as part of the signature. GnuPG-bug-id: 4595 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Return the last error for pubkey decryption.NIIBE Yutaka2019-07-051-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Check ->result against -1. When c->dek == NULL, put GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY only when not set. * g10/pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Set k->result by the result of get_it. When no secret key is available for some reasons, return the last specific error, if any. GnuPG-bug-id: 4561 Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* gpg: Print modern style key info for non-decryptable keys.Werner Koch2019-04-031-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (print_pkenc_list): Simplify. -- This changes the output from # ------------------------ >8 ------------------------ gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit RSA key, ID D20073D46DF6C97D, created 2019-04-02 "Test with PIV card" to gpg: encrypted with rsa2048 key, ID D20073D46DF6C97D, created 2019-04-02 "Test with PIV card" Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> # ------------------------ 8< ------------------------
* gpg: Fix recently introduced use after free.Werner Koch2019-03-151-3/+3
| | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Do not use freed memory. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 4407 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Implement v5 keys and v5 signatures.Werner Koch2019-03-141-16/+60
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/build-packet.c (gpg_mpi_write): New optional arg R_NWRITTEN. Allow NULL for OUT. Change all callers. (do_key): Support v5 keys. (build_sig_subpkt_from_sig): Support 32 byte fingerprints. * g10/parse-packet.c (parse_signature): First try to set the keyid from the issuer fingerprint. (parse_key): Support v5 keys. (create_gpg_control): Better make sure to always allocate the static size of the struct in case future compilers print warnings. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Add v5 support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (keyid_from_fingerprint): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/keygen.c (KEYGEN_FLAG_CREATE_V5_KEY): New. (pVERSION, pSUBVERSION): New. (add_feature_v5): New. (keygen_upd_std_prefs): Call it. (do_create_from_keygrip): Add arg keygen_flags and support the v5 flag. (common_gen): Support the v5 flag. (parse_key_parameter_part): New flags v4 and v5. (parse_key_parameter_string): Add args for version and subversion. (read_parameter_file): New keywords "Key-Version" and "Subkey-Version". (quickgen_set_para): Add arg 'version'. (quick_generate_keypair, generate_keypair): Support version parms. (do_generate_keypair): Support v5 key flag. (generate_subkeypair): Ditto. (generate_card_subkeypair): Preparse for keyflags. (gen_card_key): Ditto. * g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Add args extrahash and extrahashlen. (check_signature_end): Ditto. (check_signature_end_simple): Ditto. Use them. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Put extra hash infor into the control packet. (do_check_sig): Add args extrahas and extrahashlen and pass them on. (issuer_fpr_raw): Support 32 byte fingerprint. (check_sig_and_print): get extra hash data and pass it on. -- Note that this is only basic support and requires more fine tuning/fixing. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Report STATUS_NO_SECKEY when it is examined.NIIBE Yutaka2019-01-161-15/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/packet.h (struct pubkey_enc_list): Add result. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Initialize ->result. (proc_encrypted): Report STATUS_NO_SECKEY status. * g10/pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Set ->result. -- This change is for GPGME compatibility. Before this change, gpgme/tests/json/t-json failed with t-decrypt-verify. Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/mainproc: disable hash contexts when --skip-verify is usedJussi Kivilinna2018-12-011-3/+8
| | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Do not enable hash contexts when opt.skip_verify is set. -- Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
* g10/mainproc: avoid extra hash contexts when decrypting AEAD inputJussi Kivilinna2018-11-091-2/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (mainproc_context): New member 'seen_pkt_encrypted_aead'. (release_list): Clear 'seen_pkt_encrypted_aead'. (proc_encrypted): Set 'seen_pkt_encrypted_aead'. (have_seen_pkt_encrypted_aead): New. (proc_plaintext): Do not enable extra hash contexts when decryption AEAD input. -- Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
* all: fix spelling and typosDaniel Kahn Gillmor2018-10-241-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* g10: Change decryption key selection for public key encryption.NIIBE Yutaka2018-08-271-117/+83
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (struct mainproc_context): It's now pubkey_enc_list. (do_proc_packets): Remove the first arg CTRL. Fix call of proc_pubkey_enc. (release_list): Handle pubkey_enc_list. (proc_pubkey_enc): Remove the first arg CTRL. Simply put the packet to pubkey_enc_list. (print_pkenc_list): Remove the last arg FAILED. (proc_encrypted): Only call print_pkenc_list once. Handle DEK here. (proc_packets, proc_signature_packets, proc_signature_packets_by_fd) (proc_encryption_packets): Fix call of do_proc_packets. * g10/packet.h (struct pubkey_enc_list): Define. * g10/pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Change the second argument K. (get_session_key): Select session key by LIST, using enum_secret_keys. * g10/gpgv.c (get_session_key): Change the second argument K. * g10/test-stubs.c (get_session_key): Likewise. -- Collect all PKT_PUBKEY_ENC packets, and then, process the PKT_ENCRYPTED* packet. Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* gpg: Prepare for signatures with ISSUER_FPR but without ISSUER.Werner Koch2018-07-051-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey_for_sig): New. (get_pubkeyblock_for_sig): New. * g10/mainproc.c (issuer_fpr_raw): Give global scope. (check_sig_and_print): Use get_pubkeyblock_for_sig. * g10/pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Use get_pubkey_for_sig. * g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Ditto. (check_signature_over_key_or_uid): Ditto. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 4046 The whole getkey stuff is still a mess with way to much duplication and missing caching of already fetched data. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Sanitize diagnostic with the original file name.Werner Koch2018-06-081-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Sanitize verbose output. -- This fixes a forgotten sanitation of user supplied data in a verbose mode diagnostic. The mention CVE is about using this to inject status-fd lines into the stderr output. Other harm good as well be done. Note that GPGME based applications are not affected because GPGME does not fold status output into stderr. CVE-id: CVE-2018-12020 GnuPG-bug-id: 4012
* gpg: Also detect a plaintext packet before an encrypted packet.Werner Koch2018-06-061-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Print warning and later force an error. -- Note that when this error is triggered the plaintext from the literal data packet has already been outputted before the BEGIN_DECRYPTION status line. We fail only later to get more information. Callers need to check and act upon the decryption error code anyway. Thanks to Marcus for pointing out this case. GnuPG-bug-id: 4000 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10: Remove bogus comment.NIIBE Yutaka2018-06-051-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Remove a comment. -- GnuPG always uses the OpenPGP algo number in its status report. We can find a function in GPGME, it's _gpgme_map_pk_algo. Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* gpg: Print a hint on how to decrypt a non-mdc message anyway.Werner Koch2018-05-311-2/+19
| | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Print a hint for legacy ciphers w/o MDC. Also print a dedicated status error code Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Ignore the multiple message override options.Werner Koch2018-05-301-14/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/gpg.c (oAllowMultisigVerification) (oAllowMultipleMessages, oNoAllowMultipleMessages): Remove. (opts): Turn --allow-multisig-verification, --allow-multiple-messages and --no-allow-multiple-messages into NOPs * g10/options.h (struct opt): Remove flags.allow_multiple_messages. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Assume allow_multiple_messages is false. -- These options are very old compatibility hacks and should not be used anymore. We keep them as dummy options in case someone has them in the conf file. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Detect multiple literal plaintext packets more reliable.Werner Koch2018-05-301-2/+15
| | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Bump LITERALS_SEEN. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 4000 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Hard fail on a missing MDC even for legacy algorithms.Werner Koch2018-05-151-9/+6
| | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Require an MDC or AEAD * tests/openpgp/defs.scm (create-gpghome): Use --ignore-mdc-error to allow testing with the current files. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg: Turn --no-mdc-warn into a NOP.Werner Koch2018-05-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/gpg.c (oNoMDCWarn): Remove. (opts): Make --no-mdc-warn a NOP. (main): Don't set var. * g10/options.h (struct opt): Remove 'no_mdc_var'. * g10/cipher-cfb.c (write_header): Assume opt.no_mdc_warn is false. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Ditto. -- Users should not be allowed to suppress the warning that they are shooting into their foot. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* Merge branch 'STABLE-BRANCH-2-2' into masterWerner Koch2018-05-131-21/+42
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | -- Resolved Conflicts: NEWS - removed configure.ac - removed Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
| * g10: Fix memory leak in check_sig_and_print.NIIBE Yutaka2018-04-131-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Free the public key. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 3900 Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
| * gpg: Extend the "sig" record in --list-mode.Werner Koch2018-04-121-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/getkey.c (get_user_id_string): Add arg R_NOUID. Change call callers. (get_user_id): Add arg R_NOUID. Change call callers. * g10/mainproc.c (issuer_fpr_string): Make global. * g10/keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Print a '?' for a missing key also in --list-mode. Print the "issuer fpr" field also if there is an issuer fingerprint subpacket. -- Scripts used to rely on the "User ID not found" string even in the --with-colons listing. However, that is not a good idea because that string is subject to translations etc. Now we have an explicit way of telling that a key is missing. For example: gpg --list-sigs --with-colons | \ awk -F: '$1=="sig" && $2=="?" {if($13){print $13}else{print $5}}' Prints all keyids or fingerprint of signing keys for which we do not have the key in our local keyring. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
| * gpg: Extend the ERRSIG status line with a fingerprint.Werner Koch2018-04-121-19/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (issuer_fpr_raw): New. (issuer_fpr_string): Re-implement using issuer_fpr_rtaw. (check_sig_and_print): Don't free ISSUER_FPR. Use ISSUER_FPR_RAW. Use write_status_printf. Extend ERRSIG status. -- Modern OpenPGP implementations put the ISSUER_FPR into the signature to make it easier to discover the, public needed to check the signature. This is also useful in error messages and thus we add it. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* | gpg: Try to mitigate the problem of wrong CFB symkey passphrases.Werner Koch2018-02-231-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_seskey): Check for a valid algo. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 3795 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* | Merge branch 'STABLE-BRANCH-2-2' into masterWerner Koch2018-01-251-4/+6
|\| | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
| * gpg: Print all keys with --decrypt --list-only.Werner Koch2018-01-081-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Use dedicated error code for list-only and put the key into PKENC_LIST. (print_pkenc_list): Take care of the new error code. -- If the secret keys exist in --list-only mode it was not printed in --list-only mode. GnuPG-bug-id: 3718 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* | gpg: Clear the symmetric passphrase cache for encrypted session keys.Werner Koch2018-01-231-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Clear the symmetric key cache on error. (proc_encrypted): Need to take are of the checksum error. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
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