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| author | David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com> | 2020-07-21 11:44:45 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> | 2020-07-28 11:41:11 +0200 |
| commit | a59a2edbbba7397fede86e40a3da17e5beebf98b (patch) | |
| tree | fe9e1c6219cee12a7013d8b1b8e39b4b18c551b3 /arch/arm64/Kconfig | |
| parent | KVM: arm64: Make nVHE ASLR conditional on RANDOMIZE_BASE (diff) | |
| download | linux-a59a2edbbba7397fede86e40a3da17e5beebf98b.tar.xz linux-a59a2edbbba7397fede86e40a3da17e5beebf98b.zip | |
KVM: arm64: Substitute RANDOMIZE_BASE for HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
The HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS config maps vectors at a fixed location on cores which
are susceptible to Spector variant 3a (A57, A72) to prevent defeating hyp
layout randomization by leaking the value of VBAR_EL2.
Since this feature is only applicable when EL2 layout randomization is enabled,
unify both behind the same RANDOMIZE_BASE Kconfig. Majority of code remains
conditional on a capability selected for the affected cores.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721094445.82184-3-dbrazdil@google.com
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/Kconfig | 16 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 31380da53689..152deef3277e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1182,22 +1182,6 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR If unsure, say Y. -config HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS - bool "Harden EL2 vector mapping against system register leak" if EXPERT - default y - help - Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can - be used to leak privileged information such as the vector base - register, resulting in a potential defeat of the EL2 layout - randomization. - - This config option will map the vectors to a fixed location, - independent of the EL2 code mapping, so that revealing VBAR_EL2 - to an attacker does not give away any extra information. This - only gets enabled on affected CPUs. - - If unsure, say Y. - config ARM64_SSBD bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT default y |