| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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KVM x86 fixes for 6.13:
- Disable AVIC on SNP-enabled systems that don't allow writes to the virtual
APIC page, as such hosts will hit unexpected RMP #PFs in the host when
running VMs of any flavor.
- Fix a WARN in the hypercall completion path due to KVM trying to determine
if a guest with protected register state is in 64-bit mode (KVM's ABI is to
assume such guests only make hypercalls in 64-bit mode).
- Allow the guest to write to supported bits in MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG to fix a
regression with Windows guests, and because KVM's read-only behavior appears
to be entirely made up.
- Treat TDP MMU faults as spurious if the faulting access is allowed given the
existing SPTE. This fixes a benign WARN (other than the WARN itself) due to
unexpectedly replacing a writable SPTE with a read-only SPTE.
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Treat slow-path TDP MMU faults as spurious if the access is allowed given
the existing SPTE to fix a benign warning (other than the WARN itself)
due to replacing a writable SPTE with a read-only SPTE, and to avoid the
unnecessary LOCK CMPXCHG and subsequent TLB flush.
If a read fault races with a write fault, fast GUP fails for any reason
when trying to "promote" the read fault to a writable mapping, and KVM
resolves the write fault first, then KVM will end up trying to install a
read-only SPTE (for a !map_writable fault) overtop a writable SPTE.
Note, it's not entirely clear why fast GUP fails, or if that's even how
KVM ends up with a !map_writable fault with a writable SPTE. If something
else is going awry, e.g. due to a bug in mmu_notifiers, then treating read
faults as spurious in this scenario could effectively mask the underlying
problem.
However, retrying the faulting access instead of overwriting an existing
SPTE is functionally correct and desirable irrespective of the WARN, and
fast GUP _can_ legitimately fail with a writable VMA, e.g. if the Accessed
bit in primary MMU's PTE is toggled and causes a PTE value mismatch. The
WARN was also recently added, specifically to track down scenarios where
KVM is unnecessarily overwrites SPTEs, i.e. treating the fault as spurious
doesn't regress KVM's bug-finding capabilities in any way. In short,
letting the WARN linger because there's a tiny chance it's due to a bug
elsewhere would be excessively paranoid.
Fixes: 1a175082b190 ("KVM: x86/mmu: WARN and flush if resolving a TDP MMU fault clears MMU-writable")
Reported-by: Lei Yang <leiyang@redhat.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219588
Tested-by: Lei Yang <leiyang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241218213611.3181643-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Drop KVM's arbitrary behavior of making DE_CFG.LFENCE_SERIALIZE read-only
for the guest, as rejecting writes can lead to guest crashes, e.g. Windows
in particular doesn't gracefully handle unexpected #GPs on the WRMSR, and
nothing in the AMD manuals suggests that LFENCE_SERIALIZE is read-only _if
it exists_.
KVM only allows LFENCE_SERIALIZE to be set, by the guest or host, if the
underlying CPU has X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC, i.e. if LFENCE is guaranteed
to be serializing. So if the guest sets LFENCE_SERIALIZE, KVM will provide
the desired/correct behavior without any additional action (the guest's
value is never stuffed into hardware). And having LFENCE be serializing
even when it's not _required_ to be is a-ok from a functional perspective.
Fixes: 74a0e79df68a ("KVM: SVM: Disallow guest from changing userspace's MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG value")
Fixes: d1d93fa90f1a ("KVM: SVM: Add MSR-based feature support for serializing LFENCE")
Reported-by: Simon Pilkington <simonp.git@mailbox.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/52914da7-a97b-45ad-86a0-affdf8266c61@mailbox.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241211172952.1477605-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Use is_64_bit_hypercall() instead of is_64_bit_mode() to detect a 64-bit
hypercall when completing said hypercall. For guests with protected state,
e.g. SEV-ES and SEV-SNP, KVM must assume the hypercall was made in 64-bit
mode as the vCPU state needed to detect 64-bit mode is unavailable.
Hacking the sev_smoke_test selftest to generate a KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE
hypercall via VMGEXIT trips the WARN:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 273 PID: 326626 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.h:180 complete_hypercall_exit+0x44/0xe0 [kvm]
Modules linked in: kvm_amd kvm ... [last unloaded: kvm]
CPU: 273 UID: 0 PID: 326626 Comm: sev_smoke_test Not tainted 6.12.0-smp--392e932fa0f3-feat #470
Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20240617.0-0 06/17/2024
RIP: 0010:complete_hypercall_exit+0x44/0xe0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x2400/0x2720 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x54f/0x630 [kvm]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x6b/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fixes: b5aead0064f3 ("KVM: x86: Assume a 64-bit hypercall for guests with protected state")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241128004344.4072099-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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On SNP-enabled system, VMRUN marks AVIC Backing Page as in-use while
the guest is running for both secure and non-secure guest. Any hypervisor
write to the in-use vCPU's AVIC backing page (e.g. to inject an interrupt)
will generate unexpected #PF in the host.
Currently, attempt to run AVIC guest would result in the following error:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff3a442e549cc270
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x80000003) - RMP violation
PGD b6ee01067 P4D b6ee02067 PUD 10096d063 PMD 11c540063 PTE 80000001149cc163
SEV-SNP: PFN 0x1149cc unassigned, dumping non-zero entries in 2M PFN region: [0x114800 - 0x114a00]
...
Newer AMD system is enhanced to allow hypervisor to modify the backing page
for non-secure guest on SNP-enabled system. This enhancement is available
when the CPUID Fn8000_001F_EAX bit 30 is set (HvInUseWrAllowed).
This table describes AVIC support matrix w.r.t. SNP enablement:
| Non-SNP system | SNP system
-----------------------------------------------------
Non-SNP guest | AVIC Activate | AVIC Activate iff
| | HvInuseWrAllowed=1
-----------------------------------------------------
SNP guest | N/A | Secure AVIC
Therefore, check and disable AVIC in kvm_amd driver when the feature is not
available on SNP-enabled system.
See the AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual (APM) Volume 2 for detail.
(https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/
programmer-references/40332.pdf)
Fixes: 216d106c7ff7 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP host initialization support")
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241104075845.7583-1-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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When running KVM with ignore_msrs=1 and report_ignored_msrs=0, the user has
no clue that that the guest is being lied to. This may cause bug reports
such as https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2571, where enabling
a CPUID bit in QEMU caused Linux guests to try reading MSR_CU_DEF_ERR; and
being lied about the existence of MSR_CU_DEF_ERR caused the guest to assume
other things about the local APIC which were not true:
Sep 14 12:02:53 kernel: mce: [Firmware Bug]: Your BIOS is not setting up LVT offset 0x2 for deferred error IRQs correctly.
Sep 14 12:02:53 kernel: unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x852 at rIP: 0xffffffffb548ffa7 (native_read_msr+0x7/0x40)
Sep 14 12:02:53 kernel: Call Trace:
...
Sep 14 12:02:53 kernel: native_apic_msr_read+0x20/0x30
Sep 14 12:02:53 kernel: setup_APIC_eilvt+0x47/0x110
Sep 14 12:02:53 kernel: mce_amd_feature_init+0x485/0x4e0
...
Sep 14 12:02:53 kernel: [Firmware Bug]: cpu 0, try to use APIC520 (LVT offset 2) for vector 0xf4, but the register is already in use for vector 0x0 on this cpu
Without reported_ignored_msrs=0 at least the host kernel log will contain
enough information to avoid going on a wild goose chase. But if reports
about individual MSR accesses are being silenced too, at least complain
loudly the first time a VM is started.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The header clearly states that it does not want to be included directly,
only via '<linux/bitmap.h>'. Replace the include accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Message-ID: <20241217070539.2433-2-wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Snapshot the output of CPUID.0xD.[1..n] during kvm.ko initiliaization to
avoid the overead of CPUID during runtime. The offset, size, and metadata
for CPUID.0xD.[1..n] sub-leaves does not depend on XCR0 or XSS values, i.e.
is constant for a given CPU, and thus can be cached during module load.
On Intel's Emerald Rapids, CPUID is *wildly* expensive, to the point where
recomputing XSAVE offsets and sizes results in a 4x increase in latency of
nested VM-Enter and VM-Exit (nested transitions can trigger
xstate_required_size() multiple times per transition), relative to using
cached values. The issue is easily visible by running `perf top` while
triggering nested transitions: kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() shows up at a
whopping 50%.
As measured via RDTSC from L2 (using KVM-Unit-Test's CPUID VM-Exit test
and a slightly modified L1 KVM to handle CPUID in the fastpath), a nested
roundtrip to emulate CPUID on Skylake (SKX), Icelake (ICX), and Emerald
Rapids (EMR) takes:
SKX 11650
ICX 22350
EMR 28850
Using cached values, the latency drops to:
SKX 6850
ICX 9000
EMR 7900
The underlying issue is that CPUID itself is slow on ICX, and comically
slow on EMR. The problem is exacerbated on CPUs which support XSAVES
and/or XSAVEC, as KVM invokes xstate_required_size() twice on each
runtime CPUID update, and because there are more supported XSAVE features
(CPUID for supported XSAVE feature sub-leafs is significantly slower).
SKX:
CPUID.0xD.2 = 348 cycles
CPUID.0xD.3 = 400 cycles
CPUID.0xD.4 = 276 cycles
CPUID.0xD.5 = 236 cycles
<other sub-leaves are similar>
EMR:
CPUID.0xD.2 = 1138 cycles
CPUID.0xD.3 = 1362 cycles
CPUID.0xD.4 = 1068 cycles
CPUID.0xD.5 = 910 cycles
CPUID.0xD.6 = 914 cycles
CPUID.0xD.7 = 1350 cycles
CPUID.0xD.8 = 734 cycles
CPUID.0xD.9 = 766 cycles
CPUID.0xD.10 = 732 cycles
CPUID.0xD.11 = 718 cycles
CPUID.0xD.12 = 734 cycles
CPUID.0xD.13 = 1700 cycles
CPUID.0xD.14 = 1126 cycles
CPUID.0xD.15 = 898 cycles
CPUID.0xD.16 = 716 cycles
CPUID.0xD.17 = 748 cycles
CPUID.0xD.18 = 776 cycles
Note, updating runtime CPUID information multiple times per nested
transition is itself a flaw, especially since CPUID is a mandotory
intercept on both Intel and AMD. E.g. KVM doesn't need to ensure emulated
CPUID state is up-to-date while running L2. That flaw will be fixed in a
future patch, as deferring runtime CPUID updates is more subtle than it
appears at first glance, the benefits aren't super critical to have once
the XSAVE issue is resolved, and caching CPUID output is desirable even if
KVM's updates are deferred.
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20241211013302.1347853-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"The biggest change here is eliminating the awful idea that KVM had of
essentially guessing which pfns are refcounted pages.
The reason to do so was that KVM needs to map both non-refcounted
pages (for example BARs of VFIO devices) and VM_PFNMAP/VM_MIXMEDMAP
VMAs that contain refcounted pages.
However, the result was security issues in the past, and more recently
the inability to map VM_IO and VM_PFNMAP memory that _is_ backed by
struct page but is not refcounted. In particular this broke virtio-gpu
blob resources (which directly map host graphics buffers into the
guest as "vram" for the virtio-gpu device) with the amdgpu driver,
because amdgpu allocates non-compound higher order pages and the tail
pages could not be mapped into KVM.
This requires adjusting all uses of struct page in the
per-architecture code, to always work on the pfn whenever possible.
The large series that did this, from David Stevens and Sean
Christopherson, also cleaned up substantially the set of functions
that provided arch code with the pfn for a host virtual addresses.
The previous maze of twisty little passages, all different, is
replaced by five functions (__gfn_to_page, __kvm_faultin_pfn, the
non-__ versions of these two, and kvm_prefetch_pages) saving almost
200 lines of code.
ARM:
- Support for stage-1 permission indirection (FEAT_S1PIE) and
permission overlays (FEAT_S1POE), including nested virt + the
emulated page table walker
- Introduce PSCI SYSTEM_OFF2 support to KVM + client driver. This
call was introduced in PSCIv1.3 as a mechanism to request
hibernation, similar to the S4 state in ACPI
- Explicitly trap + hide FEAT_MPAM (QoS controls) from KVM guests. As
part of it, introduce trivial initialization of the host's MPAM
context so KVM can use the corresponding traps
- PMU support under nested virtualization, honoring the guest
hypervisor's trap configuration and event filtering when running a
nested guest
- Fixes to vgic ITS serialization where stale device/interrupt table
entries are not zeroed when the mapping is invalidated by the VM
- Avoid emulated MMIO completion if userspace has requested
synchronous external abort injection
- Various fixes and cleanups affecting pKVM, vCPU initialization, and
selftests
LoongArch:
- Add iocsr and mmio bus simulation in kernel.
- Add in-kernel interrupt controller emulation.
- Add support for virtualization extensions to the eiointc irqchip.
PPC:
- Drop lingering and utterly obsolete references to PPC970 KVM, which
was removed 10 years ago.
- Fix incorrect documentation references to non-existing ioctls
RISC-V:
- Accelerate KVM RISC-V when running as a guest
- Perf support to collect KVM guest statistics from host side
s390:
- New selftests: more ucontrol selftests and CPU model sanity checks
- Support for the gen17 CPU model
- List registers supported by KVM_GET/SET_ONE_REG in the
documentation
x86:
- Cleanup KVM's handling of Accessed and Dirty bits to dedup code,
improve documentation, harden against unexpected changes.
Even if the hardware A/D tracking is disabled, it is possible to
use the hardware-defined A/D bits to track if a PFN is Accessed
and/or Dirty, and that removes a lot of special cases.
- Elide TLB flushes when aging secondary PTEs, as has been done in
x86's primary MMU for over 10 years.
- Recover huge pages in-place in the TDP MMU when dirty page logging
is toggled off, instead of zapping them and waiting until the page
is re-accessed to create a huge mapping. This reduces vCPU jitter.
- Batch TLB flushes when dirty page logging is toggled off. This
reduces the time it takes to disable dirty logging by ~3x.
- Remove the shrinker that was (poorly) attempting to reclaim shadow
page tables in low-memory situations.
- Clean up and optimize KVM's handling of writes to
MSR_IA32_APICBASE.
- Advertise CPUIDs for new instructions in Clearwater Forest
- Quirk KVM's misguided behavior of initialized certain feature MSRs
to their maximum supported feature set, which can result in KVM
creating invalid vCPU state. E.g. initializing PERF_CAPABILITIES to
a non-zero value results in the vCPU having invalid state if
userspace hides PDCM from the guest, which in turn can lead to
save/restore failures.
- Fix KVM's handling of non-canonical checks for vCPUs that support
LA57 to better follow the "architecture", in quotes because the
actual behavior is poorly documented. E.g. most MSR writes and
descriptor table loads ignore CR4.LA57 and operate purely on
whether the CPU supports LA57.
- Bypass the register cache when querying CPL from kvm_sched_out(),
as filling the cache from IRQ context is generally unsafe; harden
the cache accessors to try to prevent similar issues from occuring
in the future. The issue that triggered this change was already
fixed in 6.12, but was still kinda latent.
- Advertise AMD_IBPB_RET to userspace, and fix a related bug where
KVM over-advertises SPEC_CTRL when trying to support cross-vendor
VMs.
- Minor cleanups
- Switch hugepage recovery thread to use vhost_task.
These kthreads can consume significant amounts of CPU time on
behalf of a VM or in response to how the VM behaves (for example
how it accesses its memory); therefore KVM tried to place the
thread in the VM's cgroups and charge the CPU time consumed by that
work to the VM's container.
However the kthreads did not process SIGSTOP/SIGCONT, and therefore
cgroups which had KVM instances inside could not complete freezing.
Fix this by replacing the kthread with a PF_USER_WORKER thread, via
the vhost_task abstraction. Another 100+ lines removed, with
generally better behavior too like having these threads properly
parented in the process tree.
- Revert a workaround for an old CPU erratum (Nehalem/Westmere) that
didn't really work; there was really nothing to work around anyway:
the broken patch was meant to fix nested virtualization, but the
PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL MSR is virtualized and therefore unaffected by the
erratum.
- Fix 6.12 regression where CONFIG_KVM will be built as a module even
if asked to be builtin, as long as neither KVM_INTEL nor KVM_AMD is
'y'.
x86 selftests:
- x86 selftests can now use AVX.
Documentation:
- Use rST internal links
- Reorganize the introduction to the API document
Generic:
- Protect vcpu->pid accesses outside of vcpu->mutex with a rwlock
instead of RCU, so that running a vCPU on a different task doesn't
encounter long due to having to wait for all CPUs become quiescent.
In general both reads and writes are rare, but userspace that
supports confidential computing is introducing the use of "helper"
vCPUs that may jump from one host processor to another. Those will
be very happy to trigger a synchronize_rcu(), and the effect on
performance is quite the disaster"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (298 commits)
KVM: x86: Break CONFIG_KVM_X86's direct dependency on KVM_INTEL || KVM_AMD
KVM: x86: add back X86_LOCAL_APIC dependency
Revert "KVM: VMX: Move LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL errata handling out of setup_vmcs_config()"
KVM: x86: switch hugepage recovery thread to vhost_task
KVM: x86: expose MSR_PLATFORM_INFO as a feature MSR
x86: KVM: Advertise CPUIDs for new instructions in Clearwater Forest
Documentation: KVM: fix malformed table
irqchip/loongson-eiointc: Add virt extension support
LoongArch: KVM: Add irqfd support
LoongArch: KVM: Add PCHPIC user mode read and write functions
LoongArch: KVM: Add PCHPIC read and write functions
LoongArch: KVM: Add PCHPIC device support
LoongArch: KVM: Add EIOINTC user mode read and write functions
LoongArch: KVM: Add EIOINTC read and write functions
LoongArch: KVM: Add EIOINTC device support
LoongArch: KVM: Add IPI user mode read and write function
LoongArch: KVM: Add IPI read and write function
LoongArch: KVM: Add IPI device support
LoongArch: KVM: Add iocsr and mmio bus simulation in kernel
KVM: arm64: Pass on SVE mapping failures
...
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Rework CONFIG_KVM_X86's dependency to only check if KVM_INTEL or KVM_AMD
is selected, i.e. not 'n'. Having KVM_X86 depend directly on the vendor
modules results in KVM_X86 being set to 'm' if at least one of KVM_INTEL
or KVM_AMD is enabled, but neither is 'y', regardless of the value of KVM
itself.
The documentation for def_tristate doesn't explicitly state that this is
the intended behavior, but it does clearly state that the "if" section is
parsed as a dependency, i.e. the behavior is consistent with how tristate
dependencies are handled in general.
Optionally dependencies for this default value can be added with "if".
Fixes: ea4290d77bda ("KVM: x86: leave kvm.ko out of the build if no vendor module is requested")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20241118172002.1633824-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Enabling KVM now causes a build failure on x86-32 if X86_LOCAL_APIC
is disabled:
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c: In function 'svm_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu':
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:597:9: error: 'kvm_rebooting' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'kvm_irq_routing'?
597 | kvm_rebooting = true;
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
| kvm_irq_routing
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:597:9: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
make[6]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:221: arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.o] Error 1
In file included from include/linux/rculist.h:11,
from include/linux/hashtable.h:14,
from arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c:18:
arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c: In function 'avic_pi_update_irte':
arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c:909:38: error: 'struct kvm' has no member named 'irq_routing'
909 | irq_rt = srcu_dereference(kvm->irq_routing, &kvm->irq_srcu);
| ^~
include/linux/rcupdate.h:538:17: note: in definition of macro '__rcu_dereference_check'
538 | typeof(*p) *local = (typeof(*p) *__force)READ_ONCE(p); \
Move the dependency to the same place as before.
Fixes: ea4290d77bda ("KVM: x86: leave kvm.ko out of the build if no vendor module is requested")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202410060426.e9Xsnkvi-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: add Cc to stable, tweak shortlog scope]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20241118172002.1633824-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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setup_vmcs_config()"
Revert back to clearing VM_{ENTRY,EXIT}_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL in KVM's
golden VMCS config, as applying the workaround during vCPU creation is
pointless and broken. KVM *unconditionally* clears the controls in the
values returned by vmx_vmentry_ctrl() and vmx_vmexit_ctrl(), as KVM loads
PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL if and only if its necessary to do so. E.g. if KVM wants
to run the guest with the same PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL as the host, then there's
no need to re-load the MSR on entry and exit.
Even worse, the buggy commit failed to apply the erratum where it's
actually needed, add_atomic_switch_msr(). As a result, KVM completely
ignores the erratum for all intents and purposes, i.e. uses the flawed
VMCS controls to load PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL.
To top things off, the patch was intended to be dropped, as the premise
of an L1 VMM being able to pivot on FMS is flawed, and KVM can (and now
does) fully emulate the controls in software. Simply revert the commit,
as all upstream supported kernels that have the buggy commit should also
have commit f4c93d1a0e71 ("KVM: nVMX: Always emulate PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL
VM-Entry/VM-Exit controls"), i.e. the (likely theoretical) live migration
concern is a complete non-issue.
Opportunistically drop the manual "kvm: " scope from the warning about
the erratum, as KVM now uses pr_fmt() to provide the correct scope (v6.1
kernels and earlier don't, but the erratum only applies to CPUs that are
15+ years old; it's not worth a separate patch).
This reverts commit 9d78d6fb186bc4aff41b5d6c4726b76649d3cb53.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YtnZmCutdd5tpUmz@google.com
Fixes: 9d78d6fb186b ("KVM: VMX: Move LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL errata handling out of setup_vmcs_config()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20241119011433.1797921-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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kvm_vm_create_worker_thread() is meant to be used for kthreads that
can consume significant amounts of CPU time on behalf of a VM or in
response to how the VM behaves (for example how it accesses its memory).
Therefore it wants to charge the CPU time consumed by that work to
the VM's container.
However, because of these threads, cgroups which have kvm instances
inside never complete freezing. This can be trivially reproduced:
root@test ~# mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/test
root@test ~# echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/test/cgroup.procs
root@test ~# qemu-system-x86_64 -nographic -enable-kvm
and in another terminal:
root@test ~# echo 1 > /sys/fs/cgroup/test/cgroup.freeze
root@test ~# cat /sys/fs/cgroup/test/cgroup.events
populated 1
frozen 0
The cgroup freezing happens in the signal delivery path but
kvm_nx_huge_page_recovery_worker, while joining non-root cgroups, never
calls into the signal delivery path and thus never gets frozen. Because
the cgroup freezer determines whether a given cgroup is frozen by
comparing the number of frozen threads to the total number of threads
in the cgroup, the cgroup never becomes frozen and users waiting for
the state transition may hang indefinitely.
Since the worker kthread is tied to a user process, it's better if
it behaves similarly to user tasks as much as possible, including
being able to send SIGSTOP and SIGCONT. In fact, vhost_task is all
that kvm_vm_create_worker_thread() wanted to be and more: not only it
inherits the userspace process's cgroups, it has other niceties like
being parented properly in the process tree. Use it instead of the
homegrown alternative.
Incidentally, the new code is also better behaved when you flip recovery
back and forth to disabled and back to enabled. If your recovery period
is 1 minute, it will run the next recovery after 1 minute independent
of how many times you flipped the parameter.
(Commit message based on emails from Tejun).
Reported-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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For userspace that wants to disable KVM_X86_QUIRK_STUFF_FEATURE_MSRS, it
is useful to know what bits can be set to 1 in MSR_PLATFORM_INFO (apart
from the TSC ratio). The right way to do that is via /dev/kvm's
feature MSR mechanism.
In fact, MSR_PLATFORM_INFO is already a feature MSR for the purpose of
blocking updates after the vCPU is run, but KVM_GET_MSRS did not return
a valid value for it.
Just like in a VM that leaves KVM_X86_QUIRK_STUFF_FEATURE_MSRS enabled,
the TSC ratio field is left to 0. Only bit 31 is set.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Latest Intel platform Clearwater Forest has introduced new instructions
enumerated by CPUIDs of SHA512, SM3, SM4 and AVX-VNNI-INT16. Advertise
these CPUIDs to userspace so that guests can query them directly.
SHA512, SM3 and SM4 are on an expected-dense CPUID leaf and some other
bits on this leaf have kernel usages. Considering they have not truly
kernel usages, hide them in /proc/cpuinfo.
These new instructions only operate in xmm, ymm registers and have no new
VMX controls, so there is no additional host enabling required for guests
to use these instructions, i.e. advertising these CPUIDs to userspace is
safe.
Tested-by: Jiaan Lu <jiaan.lu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tao Su <tao1.su@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <20241105054825.870939-1-tao1.su@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- Drop obsolete references to PPC970 KVM, which was removed 10 years ago.
- Fix incorrect references to non-existing ioctls
- List registers supported by KVM_GET/SET_ONE_REG on s390
- Use rST internal links
- Reorganize the introduction to the API document
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KVM x86 misc changes for 6.13
- Clean up and optimize KVM's handling of writes to MSR_IA32_APICBASE.
- Quirk KVM's misguided behavior of initialized certain feature MSRs to
their maximum supported feature set, which can result in KVM creating
invalid vCPU state. E.g. initializing PERF_CAPABILITIES to a non-zero
value results in the vCPU having invalid state if userspace hides PDCM
from the guest, which can lead to save/restore failures.
- Fix KVM's handling of non-canonical checks for vCPUs that support LA57
to better follow the "architecture", in quotes because the actual
behavior is poorly documented. E.g. most MSR writes and descriptor
table loads ignore CR4.LA57 and operate purely on whether the CPU
supports LA57.
- Bypass the register cache when querying CPL from kvm_sched_out(), as
filling the cache from IRQ context is generally unsafe, and harden the
cache accessors to try to prevent similar issues from occuring in the
future.
- Advertise AMD_IBPB_RET to userspace, and fix a related bug where KVM
over-advertises SPEC_CTRL when trying to support cross-vendor VMs.
- Minor cleanups
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Do nothing in all of kvm_apic_set_base(), not just __kvm_apic_set_base(),
if the incoming MSR value is the same as the current value. Validating
the mode transitions is obviously unnecessary, and rejecting the write is
pointless if the vCPU already has an invalid value, e.g. if userspace is
doing weird things and modified guest CPUID after setting MSR_IA32_APICBASE.
Bailing early avoids kvm_recalculate_apic_map()'s slow path in the rare
scenario where the map is DIRTY due to some other vCPU dirtying the map,
in which case it's the other vCPU/task's responsibility to recalculate the
map.
Note, kvm_lapic_reset() calls __kvm_apic_set_base() only when emulating
RESET, in which case the old value is guaranteed to be zero, and the new
value is guaranteed to be non-zero. I.e. all callers of
__kvm_apic_set_base() effectively pre-check for the MSR value actually
changing. Don't bother keeping the check in __kvm_apic_set_base(), as no
additional callers are expected, and implying that the MSR might already
be non-zero at the time of kvm_lapic_reset() could confuse readers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241101183555.1794700-10-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Pass in the new value and "host initiated" as separate parameters to
kvm_apic_set_base(), as forcing the KVM_SET_SREGS path to declare and fill
an msr_data structure is awkward and kludgy, e.g. __set_sregs_common()
doesn't even bother to set the proper MSR index.
No functional change intended.
Suggested-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241101183555.1794700-9-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Make kvm_recalculate_apic_map() local to lapic.c now that all external
callers are gone.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009181742.1128779-8-seanjc@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241101183555.1794700-8-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Rename kvm_set_apic_base() and kvm_lapic_set_base() to kvm_apic_set_base()
and __kvm_apic_set_base() respectively to capture that the underscores
version is a "special" variant (it exists purely to avoid recalculating
the optimized map multiple times when stuffing the RESET value).
Opportunistically add a comment explaining why kvm_lapic_reset() uses the
inner helper. Note, KVM deliberately invokes kvm_arch_vcpu_create() while
kvm->lock is NOT held so that vCPU setup isn't serialized if userspace is
creating multiple/all vCPUs in parallel. I.e. triggering an extra
recalculation is not limited to theoretical/rare edge cases, and so is
worth avoiding.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009181742.1128779-7-seanjc@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241101183555.1794700-7-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move kvm_set_apic_base() to lapic.c so that the bulk of KVM's local APIC
code resides in lapic.c, regardless of whether or not KVM is emulating the
local APIC in-kernel. This will also allow making various helpers visible
only to lapic.c.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009181742.1128779-6-seanjc@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241101183555.1794700-6-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Inline kvm_get_apic_mode() in lapic.h to avoid a CALL+RET as well as an
export. The underlying kvm_apic_mode() helper is public information, i.e.
there is no state/information that needs to be hidden from vendor modules.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009181742.1128779-5-seanjc@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241101183555.1794700-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Access KVM's emulated APIC base MSR value directly instead of bouncing
through a helper, as there is no reason to add a layer of indirection, and
there are other MSRs with a "set" but no "get", e.g. EFER.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009181742.1128779-4-seanjc@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241101183555.1794700-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Now that kvm_lapic_set_base() does nothing if the "new" APIC base MSR is
the same as the current value, drop the kvm_lapic_set_base() call in the
KVM_SET_LAPIC flow that passes in the current value, as it too does
nothing.
Note, the purpose of invoking kvm_lapic_set_base() was purely to set
apic->base_address (see commit 5dbc8f3fed0b ("KVM: use kvm_lapic_set_base()
to change apic_base")). And there is no evidence that explicitly setting
apic->base_address in KVM_SET_LAPIC ever had any functional impact; even
in the original commit 96ad2cc61324 ("KVM: in-kernel LAPIC save and restore
support"), all flows that set apic_base also set apic->base_address to the
same address. E.g. svm_create_vcpu() did open code a write to apic_base,
svm->vcpu.apic_base = 0xfee00000 | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE;
but it also called kvm_create_lapic() when irqchip_in_kernel() is true.
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009181742.1128779-3-seanjc@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241101183555.1794700-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Do nothing in kvm_lapic_set_base() if the APIC base MSR value is the same
as the current value. All flows except the handling of the base address
explicitly take effect if and only if relevant bits are changing.
For the base address, invoking kvm_lapic_set_base() before KVM initializes
the base to APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE during vCPU RESET would be a KVM bug,
i.e. KVM _must_ initialize apic->base_address before exposing the vCPU (to
userspace or KVM at-large).
Note, the inhibit is intended to be set if the base address is _changed_
from the default, i.e. is also covered by the RESET behavior.
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009181742.1128779-2-seanjc@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241101183555.1794700-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Drop KVM's odd restriction that disallows clearing CPUID_FAULT in
MSR_PLATFORM_INFO if CPL>0 CPUID faulting is enabled in
MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES. KVM generally doesn't require specific
ordering when userspace sets MSRs, and the completely arbitrary order of
MSRs in emulated_msrs_all means that a userspace that uses KVM's list
verbatim could run afoul of the check.
Dropping the restriction obviously means that userspace could stuff a
nonsensical vCPU model, but that's the case all over KVM. KVM typically
restricts userspace MSR writes only when it makes things easier for KVM
and/or userspace.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802185511.305849-8-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Reject userspace accesses to ARCH_CAPABILITIES if the MSR isn't supposed
to exist, according to guest CPUID. However, "reject" accesses with
KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED, so that reads get '0' and writes of '0' are
ignored if KVM advertised support ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
KVM's ABI is that userspace must set guest CPUID prior to setting MSRs,
and that setting MSRs that aren't supposed exist is disallowed (modulo the
'0' exemption).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802185511.305849-7-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Drop the restriction that the PMU version is non-zero when handling writes
to PERF_CAPABILITIES now that KVM unconditionally checks for PDCM support.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802185511.305849-6-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Reject userspace accesses to PERF_CAPABILITIES if PDCM isn't set in guest
CPUID, i.e. if the vCPU doesn't actually have PERF_CAPABILITIES. But! Do
so via KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED, so that reads get '0' and writes of '0'
are ignored if KVM advertised support PERF_CAPABILITIES.
KVM's ABI is that userspace must set guest CPUID prior to setting MSRs,
and that setting MSRs that aren't supposed exist is disallowed (modulo the
'0' exemption).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802185511.305849-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Add a quirk to control KVM's misguided initialization of select feature
MSRs to KVM's max configuration, as enabling features by default violates
KVM's approach of letting userspace own the vCPU model, and is actively
problematic for MSRs that are conditionally supported, as the vCPU will
end up with an MSR value that userspace can't restore. E.g. if the vCPU
is configured with PDCM=0, userspace will save and attempt to restore a
non-zero PERF_CAPABILITIES, thanks to KVM's meddling.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802185511.305849-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Tag MSR_PLATFORM_INFO as a feature MSR (because it is), i.e. disallow it
from being modified after the vCPU has run.
To make KVM's selftest compliant, simply delete the userspace MSR write
that restores KVM's original value at the end of the test. Verifying that
userspace can write back what it originally read is uninteresting in this
particular case, because KVM doesn't enforce _any_ bits in the MSR, i.e.
userspace should be able to write any arbitrary value.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802185511.305849-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Bunch all of the feature MSR initialization in kvm_arch_vcpu_create() so
that it can be easily quirked in a future patch.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802185511.305849-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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HOST_RIP canonical check should check the L1 of CR4.LA57 stored in
the vmcs12 rather than the current L1's because it is legal to change
the CR4.LA57 value during VM exit from L2 to L1.
This is a theoretical bug though, because it is highly unlikely that a
VM exit will change the CR4.LA57 from the value it had on VM entry.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240906221824.491834-5-mlevitsk@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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As a result of a recent investigation, it was determined that x86 CPUs
which support 5-level paging, don't always respect CR4.LA57 when doing
canonical checks.
In particular:
1. MSRs which contain a linear address, allow full 57-bitcanonical address
regardless of CR4.LA57 state. For example: MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE.
2. All hidden segment bases and GDT/IDT bases also behave like MSRs.
This means that full 57-bit canonical address can be loaded to them
regardless of CR4.LA57, both using MSRS (e.g GS_BASE) and instructions
(e.g LGDT).
3. TLB invalidation instructions also allow the user to use full 57-bit
address regardless of the CR4.LA57.
Finally, it must be noted that the CPU doesn't prevent the user from
disabling 5-level paging, even when the full 57-bit canonical address is
present in one of the registers mentioned above (e.g GDT base).
In fact, this can happen without any userspace help, when the CPU enters
SMM mode - some MSRs, for example MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE are left to contain
a non-canonical address in regard to the new mode.
Since most of the affected MSRs and all segment bases can be read and
written freely by the guest without any KVM intervention, this patch makes
the emulator closely follow hardware behavior, which means that the
emulator doesn't take in the account the guest CPUID support for 5-level
paging, and only takes in the account the host CPU support.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240906221824.491834-4-mlevitsk@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Add emulation flags for MSR accesses and Descriptor Tables loads, and pass
the new flags as appropriate to emul_is_noncanonical_address(). The flags
will be used to perform the correct canonical check, as the type of access
affects whether or not CR4.LA57 is consulted when determining the canonical
bit.
No functional change is intended.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240906221824.491834-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com
[sean: split to separate patch, massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Add emulate_ops.is_canonical_addr() to perform (non-)canonical checks in
the emulator, which will allow extending is_noncanonical_address() to
support different flavors of canonical checks, e.g. for descriptor table
bases vs. MSRs, without needing duplicate logic in the emulator.
No functional change is intended.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240906221824.491834-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com
[sean: separate from additional of flags, massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Drop x86.h include from cpuid.h to allow the x86.h to include the cpuid.h
instead.
Also fix various places where x86.h was implicitly included via cpuid.h
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240906221824.491834-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com
[sean: fixup a missed include in mtrr.c]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Explicitly return '0' for guest RIP when handling a PMI VM-Exit for a vCPU
with protected guest state, i.e. when KVM can't read the real RIP. While
there is no "right" value, and profiling a protect guest is rather futile,
returning the last known RIP is worse than returning obviously "bad" data.
E.g. for SEV-ES+, the last known RIP will often point somewhere in the
guest's boot flow.
Opportunistically add WARNs to effectively assert that the in_kernel() and
get_ip() callbacks are restricted to the common PMI handler, as the return
values for the protected guest state case are largely arbitrary, i.e. only
make any sense whatsoever for PMIs, where the returned values have no
functional impact and thus don't truly matter.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009175002.1118178-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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When lockdep is enabled, assert that KVM accesses the register caches if
and only if cache fills are guaranteed to consume fresh data, i.e. when
KVM when KVM is in control of the code sequence. Concretely, the caches
can only be used from task context (synchronous) or when handling a PMI
VM-Exit (asynchronous, but only in specific windows where the caches are
in a known, stable state).
Generally speaking, there are very few flows where reading register state
from an asynchronous context is correct or even necessary. So, rather
than trying to figure out a generic solution, simply disallow using the
caches outside of task context by default, and deal with any future
exceptions on a case-by-case basis _if_ they arise.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009175002.1118178-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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When querying guest CPL to determine if a vCPU was preempted while in
kernel mode, bypass the register cache, i.e. always read SS.AR_BYTES from
the VMCS on Intel CPUs. If the kernel is running with full preemption
enabled, using the register cache in the preemption path can result in
stale and/or uninitialized data being cached in the segment cache.
In particular the following scenario is currently possible:
- vCPU is just created, and the vCPU thread is preempted before
SS.AR_BYTES is written in vmx_vcpu_reset().
- When scheduling out the vCPU task, kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel() =>
vmx_get_cpl() reads and caches '0' for SS.AR_BYTES.
- vmx_vcpu_reset() => seg_setup() configures SS.AR_BYTES, but doesn't
invoke vmx_segment_cache_clear() to invalidate the cache.
As a result, KVM retains a stale value in the cache, which can be read,
e.g. via KVM_GET_SREGS. Usually this is not a problem because the VMX
segment cache is reset on each VM-Exit, but if the userspace VMM (e.g KVM
selftests) reads and writes system registers just after the vCPU was
created, _without_ modifying SS.AR_BYTES, userspace will write back the
stale '0' value and ultimately will trigger a VM-Entry failure due to
incorrect SS segment type.
Note, the VM-Enter failure can also be avoided by moving the call to
vmx_segment_cache_clear() until after the vmx_vcpu_reset() initializes all
segments. However, while that change is correct and desirable (and will
come along shortly), it does not address the underlying problem that
accessing KVM's register caches from !task context is generally unsafe.
In addition to fixing the immediate bug, bypassing the cache for this
particular case will allow hardening KVM register caching log to assert
that the caches are accessed only when KVM _knows_ it is safe to do so.
Fixes: de63ad4cf497 ("KVM: X86: implement the logic for spinlock optimization")
Reported-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240716022014.240960-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009175002.1118178-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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From Intel's documentation [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]
enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS)
and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2],
"Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the
predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command
on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that
indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and
near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows
that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the
predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same
logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]
On the other hand, AMD's IBPB "may not prevent return branch
predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].
However, some AMD processors have an "enhanced IBPB" [terminology
mine] which does clear the return address predictor. This feature is
enumerated by CPUID.80000008:EDX.IBPB_RET[bit 30] [4].
Adjust the cross-vendor features enumerated by KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
accordingly.
[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/cpuid-enumeration-and-architectural-msrs.html
[2] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.html#Footnotes
[3] https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1040.html
[4] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/24594.pdf
Fixes: 0c54914d0c52 ("KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code")
Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241011214353.1625057-5-jmattson@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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This is an inherent feature of IA32_PRED_CMD[0], so it is trivially
virtualizable (as long as IA32_PRED_CMD[0] is virtualized).
Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241011214353.1625057-4-jmattson@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Wrap kvm_vcpu_exit_request()'s load of vcpu->mode with READ_ONCE() to
ensure the variable is re-loaded from memory, as there is no guarantee the
caller provides the necessary annotations to ensure KVM sees a fresh value,
e.g. the VM-Exit fastpath could theoretically reuse the pre-VM-Enter value.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240828232013.768446-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Change svm_vcpu_run() to vcpu_enter_guest() in the comment of
__kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit() to make it reflect the fact.
When one thread updates VM's APICv state due to updating the APICv
inhibit reasons, it kicks off all vCPUs and makes them wait until the
new reason has been updated and can be seen by all vCPUs.
There was one WARN() to make sure VM's APICv state is consistent with
vCPU's APICv state in the svm_vcpu_run(). Commit ee49a8932971 ("KVM:
x86: Move SVM's APICv sanity check to common x86") moved that WARN() to
x86 common code vcpu_enter_guest() due to the logic is not unique to
SVM, and added comments to both __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit() and
vcpu_enter_guest() to explain this.
However, although the comment in __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit()
mentioned the WARN(), it seems forgot to reflect that the WARN() had
been moved to x86 common, i.e., it still mentioned the svm_vcpu_run()
but not vcpu_enter_guest(). Fix it.
Note after the change the first line that contains vcpu_enter_guest()
exceeds 80 characters, but leave it as is to make the diff clean.
Fixes: ee49a8932971 ("KVM: x86: Move SVM's APICv sanity check to common x86")
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e462e7001b8668649347f879c66597d3327dbac2.1728383775.git.kai.huang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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The sentence "... so that KVM can the AVIC doorbell to ..." doesn't have
a verb. Fix it.
After adding the verb 'use', that line exceeds 80 characters. Thus wrap
the 'to' to the next line.
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/666e991edf81e1fccfba9466f3fe65965fcba897.1728383775.git.kai.huang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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KVM VMX change for 6.13
- Remove __invept()'s unused @gpa param, which was left behind when KVM
dropped code for invalidating a specific GPA (Intel never officially
documented support for single-address INVEPT; presumably pre-production
CPUs supported it at some point).
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Remove the unused variable "gpa" in __invept().
The INVEPT instruction only supports two types: VMX_EPT_EXTENT_CONTEXT (1)
and VMX_EPT_EXTENT_GLOBAL (2). Neither of these types requires a third
variable "gpa".
The "gpa" variable for __invept() is always set to 0 and was originally
introduced for the old non-existent type VMX_EPT_EXTENT_INDIVIDUAL_ADDR
(0). This type was removed by commit 2b3c5cbc0d81 ("kvm: don't use bit24
for detecting address-specific invalidation capability") and
commit 63f3ac48133a ("KVM: VMX: clean up declaration of VPID/EPT
invalidation types").
Since this variable is not useful for error handling either, remove it to
avoid confusion.
No functional changes expected.
Cc: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241014045931.1061-1-yan.y.zhao@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Drop the per-VM zapped_obsolete_pages list now that the usage from the
defunct mmu_shrinker is gone, and instead use a local list to track pages
in kvm_zap_obsolete_pages(), the sole remaining user of
zapped_obsolete_pages.
Opportunistically add an assertion to verify and document that slots_lock
must be held, i.e. that there can only be one active instance of
kvm_zap_obsolete_pages() at any given time, and by doing so also prove
that using a local list instead of a per-VM list doesn't change any
functionality (beyond trivialities like list initialization).
Signed-off-by: Vipin Sharma <vipinsh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241101201437.1604321-2-vipinsh@google.com
[sean: split to separate patch, write changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Remove KVM's MMU shrinker and (almost) all of its related code, as the
current implementation is very disruptive to VMs (if it ever runs),
without providing any meaningful benefit[1].
Alternatively, KVM could repurpose its shrinker, e.g. to reclaim pages
from the per-vCPU caches[2], but given that no one has complained about
lack of TDP MMU support for the shrinker in the 3+ years since the TDP MMU
was enabled by default, it's safe to say that there is likely no real use
case for initiating reclaim of KVM's page tables from the shrinker.
And while clever/cute, reclaiming the per-vCPU caches doesn't scale the
same way that reclaiming in-use page table pages does. E.g. the amount of
memory being used by a VM doesn't always directly correlate with the
number vCPUs, and even when it does, reclaiming a few pages from per-vCPU
caches likely won't make much of a dent in the VM's total memory usage,
especially for VMs with huge amounts of memory.
Lastly, if it turns out that there is a strong use case for dropping the
per-vCPU caches, re-introducing the shrinker registration is trivial
compared to the complexity of actually reclaiming pages from the caches.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y45dldZnI6OIf+a5@google.com
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20241004195540.210396-3-vipinsh@google.com
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vipin Sharma <vipinsh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241101201437.1604321-2-vipinsh@google.com
[sean: keep zapped_obsolete_pages for now, massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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