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-rw-r--r--CHANGES.md6
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c156
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c329
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c34
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h4
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_gen.c56
-rw-r--r--doc/man7/EVP_PKEY-RSA.pod9
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/rsa.h6
-rw-r--r--test/evp_extra_test.c67
-rw-r--r--test/evp_pkey_provided_test.c398
-rw-r--r--util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm1
11 files changed, 943 insertions, 123 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES.md b/CHANGES.md
index 625eacb6d4..57507381e1 100644
--- a/CHANGES.md
+++ b/CHANGES.md
@@ -80,6 +80,12 @@ OpenSSL 3.2
### Changes between 3.1 and 3.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ * The EVP_PKEY_fromdata function has been augmented to allow for the derivation
+ of CRT (Chinese Remainder Theorem) parameters when requested. See the
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DERIVE_FROM_PQ param in the EVP_PKEY-RSA documentation.
+
+ *Neil Horman*
+
* The BLAKE2b hash algorithm supports a configurable output length
by setting the "size" parameter.
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c
index 7b2efa8862..1a9b783a9b 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c
@@ -64,22 +64,56 @@ static int collect_numbers(STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *numbers,
int ossl_rsa_fromdata(RSA *rsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[], int include_private)
{
const OSSL_PARAM *param_n, *param_e, *param_d = NULL;
- BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *param_p, *param_q = NULL;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *param_derive = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL;
STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors = NULL, *exps = NULL, *coeffs = NULL;
int is_private = 0;
+ int derive_from_pq = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
if (rsa == NULL)
return 0;
param_n = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N);
param_e = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E);
- if (include_private)
- param_d = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D);
- if ((param_n != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_n, &n))
- || (param_e != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_e, &e))
- || (param_d != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_d, &d)))
+ if ((param_n == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_n, &n))
+ || (param_e == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_e, &e))) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (include_private) {
+
+ param_derive = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_FROM_PQ);
+ if ((param_derive != NULL)
+ && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(param_derive, &derive_from_pq))
+ goto err;
+
+ param_d = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D);
+ if (param_d != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_d, &d)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (derive_from_pq) {
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* we need at minimum p, q */
+ param_p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1);
+ param_q = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2);
+ if ((param_p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_p, &p))
+ || (param_q == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_q, &q))) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ }
+ }
is_private = (d != NULL);
@@ -96,25 +130,121 @@ int ossl_rsa_fromdata(RSA *rsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[], int include_private)
ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names))
goto err;
- /* It's ok if this private key just has n, e and d */
+ if (derive_from_pq && sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) == 0
+ && sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * If we want to use crt to derive our exponents/coefficients, we
+ * need to have at least 2 factors
+ */
+ if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) < 2) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * if we have more than two factors, n and d must also have
+ * been provided
+ */
+ if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) > 2
+ && (param_n == NULL || param_d == NULL)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* build our exponents and coefficients here */
+ if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) == 2) {
+ /* for 2 factors we can use the sp800 functions to do this */
+ if (!RSA_set0_factors(rsa, sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 0),
+ sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 1))) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * once consumed by RSA_set0_factors, pop those off the stack
+ * so we don't free them below
+ */
+ sk_BIGNUM_pop(factors);
+ sk_BIGNUM_pop(factors);
+
+ /*
+ * Note: Because we only have 2 factors here, there will be no
+ * additional pinfo fields to hold additional factors, and
+ * since we set our key and 2 factors above we can skip
+ * the call to ossl_rsa_set0_all_params
+ */
+ if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(rsa,
+ RSA_bits(rsa),
+ NULL, ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ /*
+ * in the multiprime case we have to generate exps/coeffs here
+ * for each additional prime
+ */
+ if (!ossl_rsa_multiprime_derive(rsa, RSA_bits(rsa),
+ sk_BIGNUM_num(factors),
+ rsa->e, factors, exps,
+ coeffs)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we should have all our factors, exponents and
+ * coefficients
+ */
+ if (!ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#else
+ /* multiprime case is disallowed in FIPS mode, raise an error */
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+ goto err;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * It's ok if this private key just has n, e and d
+ * but only if we're not using derive_from_pq
+ */
+ if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0
+ && !ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* sanity check to ensure we used everything in our stacks */
if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0
- && !ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs))
+ || sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) != 0
+ || sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) != 0) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ "There are %d, %d, %d elements left on our factors, exps, coeffs stacks\n",
+ sk_BIGNUM_num(factors), sk_BIGNUM_num(exps),
+ sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs));
goto err;
+ }
}
-
+ BN_clear_free(p);
+ BN_clear_free(q);
sk_BIGNUM_free(factors);
sk_BIGNUM_free(exps);
sk_BIGNUM_free(coeffs);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return 1;
err:
BN_free(n);
BN_free(e);
BN_free(d);
- sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_free);
- sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(exps, BN_free);
- sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(coeffs, BN_free);
+ sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_clear_free);
+ sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(exps, BN_clear_free);
+ sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(coeffs, BN_clear_free);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return 0;
}
@@ -152,7 +282,7 @@ int ossl_rsa_todata(RSA *rsa, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[],
|| !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params,
ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names,
coeffs))
- goto err;
+ goto err;
}
#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index 0cdbb3fde2..f67e1152bb 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -71,15 +71,201 @@ int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
return rsa_keygen(rsa->libctx, rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb, 0);
}
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM)
+
+/*
+ * Given input values, q, p, n, d and e, derive the exponents
+ * and coefficients for each prime in this key, placing the result
+ * on their respective exps and coeffs stacks
+ */
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+int ossl_rsa_multiprime_derive(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
+ BIGNUM *e_value,
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors,
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs)
+{
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *pplist = NULL, *pdlist = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *factor = NULL, *newpp = NULL, *newpd = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *dval = NULL, *newexp = NULL, *newcoeff = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+ int i;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+ pplist = sk_BIGNUM_new_null();
+ if (pplist == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ pdlist = sk_BIGNUM_new_null();
+ if (pdlist == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+ if (r2 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_set_flags(r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ if (BN_copy(r1, rsa->n) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ p = sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 0);
+ q = sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 1);
+
+ /* Build list of partial products of primes */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_BIGNUM_num(factors); i++) {
+ switch (i) {
+ case 0:
+ /* our first prime, p */
+ if (!BN_sub(r2, p, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ /* second prime q */
+ if (!BN_mul(r1, p, q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ tmp = BN_dup(r1);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(pplist, tmp, sk_BIGNUM_num(pplist)))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ default:
+ factor = sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, i);
+ /* all other primes */
+ if (!BN_mul(r1, r1, factor, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ tmp = BN_dup(r1);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(pplist, tmp, sk_BIGNUM_num(pplist)))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* build list of relative d values */
+ /* p -1 */
+ if (!BN_sub(r1, p, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(r2, q, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 2; i < sk_BIGNUM_num(factors); i++) {
+ factor = sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, i);
+ dval = BN_new();
+ if (dval == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_set_flags(dval, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_sub(dval, factor, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r0, r0, dval, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(pdlist, dval, sk_BIGNUM_num(pdlist)))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate dmp1, dmq1 and additional exponents */
+ dmp1 = BN_secure_new();
+ if (dmp1 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ dmq1 = BN_secure_new();
+ if (dmq1 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mod(dmp1, rsa->d, r1, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(exps, dmp1, sk_BIGNUM_num(exps)))
+ goto err;
+ dmp1 = NULL;
+
+ if (!BN_mod(dmq1, rsa->d, r2, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(exps, dmq1, sk_BIGNUM_num(exps)))
+ goto err;
+ dmq1 = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 2; i < sk_BIGNUM_num(factors); i++) {
+ newpd = sk_BIGNUM_value(pdlist, i - 2);
+ newexp = BN_new();
+ if (newexp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(newexp, rsa->d, newpd, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(newexp);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(exps, newexp, sk_BIGNUM_num(exps)))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate iqmp and additional coefficients */
+ iqmp = BN_new();
+ if (iqmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_mod_inverse(iqmp, sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 1),
+ sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 0), ctx) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(coeffs, iqmp, sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs)))
+ goto err;
+ iqmp = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 2; i < sk_BIGNUM_num(factors); i++) {
+ newpp = sk_BIGNUM_value(pplist, i - 2);
+ newcoeff = BN_new();
+ if (newcoeff == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_mod_inverse(newcoeff, newpp, sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, i),
+ ctx) == NULL) {
+ BN_free(newcoeff);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(coeffs, newcoeff, sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs)))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(pplist, BN_free);
+ sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(pdlist, BN_free);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_clear_free(dmp1);
+ BN_clear_free(dmq1);
+ BN_clear_free(iqmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
- BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *tmp, *prime;
+ BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *tmp, *tmp2, *prime;
int n = 0, bitsr[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM], bitse = 0;
int i = 0, quo = 0, rmd = 0, adj = 0, retries = 0;
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_ULONG bitst = 0;
unsigned long error = 0;
@@ -104,6 +290,18 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
return 0;
}
+ factors = sk_BIGNUM_new_null();
+ if (factors == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ exps = sk_BIGNUM_new_null();
+ if (exps == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_new_null();
+ if (coeffs == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -137,15 +335,6 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
- goto err;
- BN_set_flags(rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
- goto err;
- BN_set_flags(rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
- goto err;
- BN_set_flags(rsa->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* initialize multi-prime components */
if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM) {
@@ -220,7 +409,7 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
ERR_set_mark();
BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
- /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
+ /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
break;
}
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
@@ -250,8 +439,14 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
/* i == 0, do nothing */
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i))
goto err;
+ tmp = BN_dup(prime);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(factors, tmp, sk_BIGNUM_num(factors)))
+ goto err;
continue;
}
+
/*
* if |r1|, product of factors so far, is not as long as expected
* (by checking the first 4 bits are less than 0x9 or greater than
@@ -298,6 +493,10 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
*/
i = -1;
bitse = 0;
+ sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_clear_free);
+ factors = sk_BIGNUM_new_null();
+ if (factors == NULL)
+ goto err;
continue;
}
retries++;
@@ -310,12 +509,20 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
goto err;
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i))
goto err;
+ tmp = BN_dup(prime);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(factors, tmp, sk_BIGNUM_num(factors)))
+ goto err;
}
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
tmp = rsa->p;
rsa->p = rsa->q;
rsa->q = tmp;
+ /* mirror this in our factor stack */
+ if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(factors, sk_BIGNUM_delete(factors, 0), 1))
+ goto err;
}
/* calculate d */
@@ -339,79 +546,51 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
goto err;
}
- {
- BIGNUM *pr0 = BN_new();
- if (pr0 == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) {
- BN_free(pr0);
- goto err; /* d */
- }
- /* We MUST free pr0 before any further use of r0 */
- BN_free(pr0);
- }
-
- {
- BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
-
- if (d == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
- /* calculate d mod (p-1) and d mod (q - 1) */
- if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)
- || !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) {
- BN_free(d);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* calculate CRT exponents */
- for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
- pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
- /* pinfo->d == r_i - 1 */
- if (!BN_mod(pinfo->d, d, pinfo->d, ctx)) {
- BN_free(d);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
- BN_free(d);
+ BN_set_flags(r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, r0, ctx) == NULL) {
+ goto err; /* d */
}
- {
- BIGNUM *p = BN_new();
+ /* derive any missing exponents and coefficients */
+ if (!ossl_rsa_multiprime_derive(rsa, bits, primes, e_value,
+ factors, exps, coeffs))
+ goto err;
- if (p == NULL)
+ /*
+ * first 2 factors/exps are already tracked in p/q/dmq1/dmp1
+ * and the first coeff is in iqmp, so pop those off the stack
+ * Note, the first 2 factors/exponents are already tracked by p and q
+ * assign dmp1/dmq1 and iqmp
+ * the remaining pinfo values are separately allocated, so copy and delete
+ * those
+ */
+ BN_clear_free(sk_BIGNUM_delete(factors, 0));
+ BN_clear_free(sk_BIGNUM_delete(factors, 0));
+ rsa->dmp1 = sk_BIGNUM_delete(exps, 0);
+ rsa->dmq1 = sk_BIGNUM_delete(exps, 0);
+ rsa->iqmp = sk_BIGNUM_delete(coeffs, 0);
+ for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
+ tmp = sk_BIGNUM_delete(factors, 0);
+ BN_copy(pinfo->r, tmp);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
+ tmp = sk_BIGNUM_delete(exps, 0);
+ tmp2 = BN_copy(pinfo->d, tmp);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
+ if (tmp2 == NULL)
goto err;
- BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
- /* calculate inverse of q mod p */
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) {
- BN_free(p);
+ tmp = sk_BIGNUM_delete(coeffs, 0);
+ tmp2 = BN_copy(pinfo->t, tmp);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
+ if (tmp2 == NULL)
goto err;
- }
-
- /* calculate CRT coefficient for other primes */
- for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
- pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
- BN_with_flags(p, pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(pinfo->t, pinfo->pp, p, ctx)) {
- BN_free(p);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* We MUST free p before any further use of rsa->p */
- BN_free(p);
}
-
ok = 1;
err:
+ sk_BIGNUM_free(factors);
+ sk_BIGNUM_free(exps);
+ sk_BIGNUM_free(coeffs);
if (ok == -1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
ok = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
index 1c3b33c28b..1bd1a0a7bd 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
@@ -744,9 +744,13 @@ int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)
DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM)
-int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
- const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
- const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs)
+/*
+ * Note: This function deletes values from the parameter
+ * stack values as they are consumed and set in the RSA key.
+ */
+int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs)
{
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old_infos = NULL;
@@ -757,6 +761,8 @@ int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
return 0;
pnum = sk_BIGNUM_num(primes);
+
+ /* we need at least 2 primes */
if (pnum < 2)
return 0;
@@ -764,6 +770,17 @@ int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 1)))
return 0;
+ /*
+ * if we managed to set everything above, remove those elements from the
+ * stack
+ * Note, we do this after the above all to ensure that we have taken
+ * ownership of all the elements in the RSA key to avoid memory leaks
+ * we also use delete 0 here as we are grabbing items from the end of the
+ * stack rather than the start, otherwise we could use pop
+ */
+ sk_BIGNUM_delete(primes, 0);
+ sk_BIGNUM_delete(primes, 0);
+
if (pnum == sk_BIGNUM_num(exps)
&& pnum == sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) + 1) {
@@ -771,6 +788,11 @@ int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 1),
sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, 0)))
return 0;
+
+ /* as above, once we consume the above params, delete them from the list */
+ sk_BIGNUM_delete(exps, 0);
+ sk_BIGNUM_delete(exps, 0);
+ sk_BIGNUM_delete(coeffs, 0);
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
@@ -786,9 +808,9 @@ int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
return 0;
for (i = 2; i < pnum; i++) {
- BIGNUM *prime = sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, i);
- BIGNUM *exp = sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, i);
- BIGNUM *coeff = sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, i - 1);
+ BIGNUM *prime = sk_BIGNUM_pop(primes);
+ BIGNUM *exp = sk_BIGNUM_pop(exps);
+ BIGNUM *coeff = sk_BIGNUM_pop(coeffs);
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(prime != NULL && exp != NULL && coeff != NULL))
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
index ea70da05ad..f0084aeab4 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
@@ -150,6 +150,10 @@ struct rsa_meth_st {
/* Macros to test if a pkey or ctx is for a PSS key */
#define pkey_is_pss(pkey) (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
#define pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx) (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+int ossl_rsa_multiprime_derive(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
+ BIGNUM *e_value,
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors, STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs);
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(const EVP_MD *sigmd,
const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_gen.c
index 9fa85bfdf3..bcc0fceab0 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_gen.c
@@ -228,13 +228,16 @@ static int rsa_validate_rng_strength(EVP_RAND_CTX *rng, int nbits)
* Returns: -1 = error,
* 0 = d is too small,
* 1 = success.
+ *
+ * SP800-56b key generation always passes a non NULL value for e.
+ * For other purposes, if e is NULL then it is assumed that e, n and d are
+ * already set in the RSA key and do not need to be recalculated.
*/
int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(RSA *rsa, int nbits,
const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret = -1;
BIGNUM *p1, *q1, *lcm, *p1q1, *gcd;
-
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
q1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -254,32 +257,37 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(RSA *rsa, int nbits,
if (ossl_rsa_get_lcm(ctx, rsa->p, rsa->q, lcm, gcd, p1, q1, p1q1) != 1)
goto err;
- /* copy e */
- BN_free(rsa->e);
- rsa->e = BN_dup(e);
- if (rsa->e == NULL)
- goto err;
+ /*
+ * if e is provided as a parameter, don't recompute e, d or n
+ */
+ if (e != NULL) {
+ /* copy e */
+ BN_free(rsa->e);
+ rsa->e = BN_dup(e);
+ if (rsa->e == NULL)
+ goto err;
- BN_clear_free(rsa->d);
- /* (Step 3) d = (e^-1) mod (LCM(p-1, q-1)) */
- rsa->d = BN_secure_new();
- if (rsa->d == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_set_flags(rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, e, lcm, ctx) == NULL)
- goto err;
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->d);
+ /* (Step 3) d = (e^-1) mod (LCM(p-1, q-1)) */
+ rsa->d = BN_secure_new();
+ if (rsa->d == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_set_flags(rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, e, lcm, ctx) == NULL)
+ goto err;
- /* (Step 3) return an error if d is too small */
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->d) <= (nbits >> 1)) {
- ret = 0;
- goto err;
- }
+ /* (Step 3) return an error if d is too small */
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->d) <= (nbits >> 1)) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
- /* (Step 4) n = pq */
- if (rsa->n == NULL)
- rsa->n = BN_new();
- if (rsa->n == NULL || !BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
- goto err;
+ /* (Step 4) n = pq */
+ if (rsa->n == NULL)
+ rsa->n = BN_new();
+ if (rsa->n == NULL || !BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
/* (Step 5a) dP = d mod (p-1) */
if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL)
diff --git a/doc/man7/EVP_PKEY-RSA.pod b/doc/man7/EVP_PKEY-RSA.pod
index dcd38fcee8..96562b6be0 100644
--- a/doc/man7/EVP_PKEY-RSA.pod
+++ b/doc/man7/EVP_PKEY-RSA.pod
@@ -132,6 +132,15 @@ The RSA "e" value. The value may be any odd number greater than or equal to
65537. The default value is 65537.
For legacy reasons a value of 3 is currently accepted but is deprecated.
+=item "rsa-derive-from-pq" (B<OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_FROM_PQ>) <unsigned integer>
+
+Indicate that missing parameters not passed in the parameter list should be
+derived if not provided. Setting a nonzero value will cause all
+needed exponents and coefficients to be derived if not available. Setting this
+option requires at least OSSL_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1, OSSL_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2,
+and OSSL_PARAM_RSA_N to be provided. This option is ignored if
+OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY is not set in the selection parameter.
+
=back
=head2 RSA key generation parameters for FIPS module testing
diff --git a/include/crypto/rsa.h b/include/crypto/rsa.h
index 8eddc168f6..cb7f84b301 100644
--- a/include/crypto/rsa.h
+++ b/include/crypto/rsa.h
@@ -54,9 +54,9 @@ RSA *ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_rsa_get0_libctx(RSA *r);
void ossl_rsa_set0_libctx(RSA *r, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
-int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
- const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
- const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs);
+int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs);
int ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *primes,
STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps,
STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs);
diff --git a/test/evp_extra_test.c b/test/evp_extra_test.c
index f3680a0fb4..131879b8e2 100644
--- a/test/evp_extra_test.c
+++ b/test/evp_extra_test.c
@@ -3080,6 +3080,70 @@ static int test_RSA_OAEP_set_null_label(void)
return ret;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+static int test_RSA_legacy(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *q = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *n = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *e = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha256();
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+
+ if (nullprov != NULL)
+ return TEST_skip("Test does not support a non-default library context");
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(p = BN_dup(BN_value_one()))
+ || !TEST_ptr(q = BN_dup(BN_value_one()))
+ || !TEST_ptr(n = BN_dup(BN_value_one()))
+ || !TEST_ptr(e = BN_dup(BN_value_one()))
+ || !TEST_ptr(d = BN_dup(BN_value_one())))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(rsa = RSA_new())
+ || !TEST_ptr(pkey = EVP_PKEY_new())
+ || !TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(RSA_set0_factors(rsa, p, q)))
+ goto err;
+ p = NULL;
+ q = NULL;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d)))
+ goto err;
+ n = NULL;
+ e = NULL;
+ d = NULL;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa)))
+ goto err;
+
+ rsa = NULL;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey)))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
+ BN_free(n);
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(d);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305)
static int test_decrypt_null_chunks(void)
{
@@ -5520,6 +5584,9 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST(test_RSA_get_set_params);
ADD_TEST(test_RSA_OAEP_set_get_params);
ADD_TEST(test_RSA_OAEP_set_null_label);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ ADD_TEST(test_RSA_legacy);
+#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305)
ADD_TEST(test_decrypt_null_chunks);
#endif
diff --git a/test/evp_pkey_provided_test.c b/test/evp_pkey_provided_test.c
index 02e7aa727c..afebd04feb 100644
--- a/test/evp_pkey_provided_test.c
+++ b/test/evp_pkey_provided_test.c
@@ -429,7 +429,8 @@ static int test_fromdata_rsa(void)
/* for better diagnostics always compare key params */
for (i = 0; fromdata_params[i].key != NULL; ++i) {
if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(bn_from, key_numbers[i]))
- || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pk, fromdata_params[i].key, &bn))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pk, fromdata_params[i].key,
+ &bn))
|| !TEST_BN_eq(bn, bn_from))
ret = 0;
}
@@ -443,6 +444,397 @@ static int test_fromdata_rsa(void)
return ret;
}
+struct check_data {
+ const char *pname;
+ BIGNUM *comparebn;
+};
+
+static int do_fromdata_rsa_derive(OSSL_PARAM *fromdata_params,
+ struct check_data check[],
+ int expected_nbits, int expected_sbits,
+ int expected_ksize)
+{
+ const OSSL_PARAM *check_param = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *check_bn = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM *todata_params = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL, *key_ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL, *copy_pk = NULL, *dup_pk = NULL;
+ int i;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx), 1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pk, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR,
+ fromdata_params), 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * get the generated key parameters back and validate that the
+ * exponents/coeffs are correct
+ */
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_todata(pk, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, &todata_params), 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; check[i].pname != NULL; i++) {
+ if (!TEST_ptr(check_param = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(todata_params,
+ check[i].pname)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(check_param, &check_bn), 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (!TEST_BN_eq(check_bn, check[i].comparebn)) {
+ TEST_info("Data mismatch for parameter %s", check[i].pname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_free(check_bn);
+ check_bn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ while (dup_pk == NULL) {
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pk), expected_nbits)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pk), expected_sbits)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_get_size(pk), expected_ksize)
+ || !TEST_false(EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pk)))
+ goto err;
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(key_ctx);
+ if (!TEST_ptr(key_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pk, "")))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_check(key_ctx), 0)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_public_check(key_ctx), 0)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_private_check(key_ctx), 0)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_pairwise_check(key_ctx), 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters() should fail for RSA */
+ if (!TEST_ptr(copy_pk = EVP_PKEY_new())
+ || !TEST_false(EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(copy_pk, pk)))
+ goto err;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(copy_pk);
+ copy_pk = NULL;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(dup_pk = EVP_PKEY_dup(pk)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_eq(pk, dup_pk), 1)) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(dup_pk);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ pk = dup_pk;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ BN_free(check_bn);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(key_ctx);
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(fromdata_params);
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(todata_params);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_fromdata_rsa_derive_from_pq_sp800(void)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL, *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM *fromdata_params = NULL;
+ struct check_data cdata[4];
+ int ret = 0;
+ /*
+ * 512-bit RSA key, extracted from this command,
+ * openssl genrsa 512 | openssl rsa -text
+ * Note: When generating a key with EVP_PKEY_fromdata, and using
+ * crt derivation, openssl requires a minimum of 512 bits of n data,
+ * and 2048 bits in the FIPS case
+ */
+ static unsigned char n_data[] =
+ {0x00, 0xc7, 0x06, 0xd8, 0x6b, 0x3c, 0x4f, 0xb7, 0x95, 0x42, 0x44, 0x90,
+ 0xbd, 0xef, 0xf3, 0xc4, 0xb5, 0xa8, 0x55, 0x9e, 0x33, 0xa3, 0x04, 0x3a,
+ 0x90, 0xe5, 0x13, 0xff, 0x87, 0x69, 0x15, 0xa4, 0x8a, 0x17, 0x10, 0xcc,
+ 0xdf, 0xf9, 0xc5, 0x0f, 0xf1, 0x12, 0xff, 0x12, 0x11, 0xe5, 0x6b, 0x5c,
+ 0x83, 0xd9, 0x43, 0xd1, 0x8a, 0x7e, 0xa6, 0x60, 0x07, 0x2e, 0xbb, 0x03,
+ 0x17, 0x2d, 0xec, 0x17, 0x87};
+ static unsigned char e_data[] = {0x01, 0x00, 0x01};
+ static unsigned char d_data[] =
+ {0x1e, 0x5e, 0x5d, 0x07, 0x7f, 0xdc, 0x6a, 0x16, 0xcc, 0x55, 0xca, 0x00,
+ 0x31, 0x6c, 0xf0, 0xc7, 0x07, 0x38, 0x89, 0x3b, 0x37, 0xd4, 0x9d, 0x5b,
+ 0x1e, 0x99, 0x3e, 0x94, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0x82, 0x86, 0x8a, 0x78, 0x34, 0x09,
+ 0x37, 0xd5, 0xe7, 0xb4, 0xef, 0x5f, 0x83, 0x94, 0xff, 0xe5, 0x36, 0x79,
+ 0x10, 0x0c, 0x38, 0xc5, 0x3a, 0x33, 0xa6, 0x7c, 0x3c, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xe0,
+ 0xf5, 0xdb, 0xe6, 0x81};
+ static unsigned char p_data[] =
+ {0x00, 0xf6, 0x61, 0x38, 0x0e, 0x1f, 0x82, 0x7c, 0xb8, 0xba, 0x00, 0xd3,
+ 0xac, 0xdc, 0x4e, 0x6b, 0x7e, 0xf7, 0x58, 0xf3, 0xd9, 0xd8, 0x21, 0xed,
+ 0x54, 0xa3, 0x36, 0xd2, 0x2c, 0x5f, 0x06, 0x7d, 0xc5};
+ static unsigned char q_data[] =
+ {0x00, 0xce, 0xcc, 0x4a, 0xa5, 0x4f, 0xd6, 0x73, 0xd0, 0x20, 0xc3, 0x98,
+ 0x64, 0x20, 0x9b, 0xc1, 0x23, 0xd8, 0x5c, 0x82, 0x4f, 0xe8, 0xa5, 0x32,
+ 0xcd, 0x7e, 0x97, 0xb4, 0xde, 0xf6, 0x4c, 0x80, 0xdb};
+ static unsigned char dmp1_data[] =
+ {0x00, 0xd1, 0x07, 0xb6, 0x79, 0x34, 0xfe, 0x8e, 0x36, 0x63, 0x88, 0xa4,
+ 0x0e, 0x3a, 0x73, 0x45, 0xfc, 0x58, 0x7a, 0x5d, 0x98, 0xeb, 0x28, 0x0d,
+ 0xa5, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x4d, 0xa0, 0x5b, 0x96, 0xb4, 0x49};
+ static unsigned char dmq1_data[] =
+ {0x5b, 0x47, 0x02, 0xdf, 0xaa, 0xb8, 0xae, 0x8f, 0xbc, 0x16, 0x79, 0x6a,
+ 0x20, 0x96, 0x7f, 0x0e, 0x92, 0x4e, 0x6a, 0xda, 0x58, 0x86, 0xaa, 0x40,
+ 0xd7, 0xd2, 0xa0, 0x6c, 0x15, 0x6c, 0xb9, 0x27};
+ static unsigned char iqmp_data[] =
+ {0x00, 0xa0, 0xd6, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0x17, 0x9e, 0xe7, 0xe6, 0x99, 0x12, 0xd6,
+ 0xd9, 0x43, 0xcf, 0xed, 0x37, 0x29, 0xf5, 0x6c, 0x3e, 0xc1, 0x7f, 0x2e,
+ 0x31, 0x3f, 0x64, 0x34, 0x66, 0x68, 0x5c, 0x22, 0x08};
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new())
+ || !TEST_ptr(n = BN_bin2bn(n_data, sizeof(n_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(e = BN_bin2bn(e_data, sizeof(e_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(d = BN_bin2bn(d_data, sizeof(d_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(p = BN_bin2bn(p_data, sizeof(p_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(q = BN_bin2bn(q_data, sizeof(q_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(dmp1 = BN_bin2bn(dmp1_data, sizeof(dmp1_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(dmq1 = BN_bin2bn(dmq1_data, sizeof(dmq1_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(iqmp = BN_bin2bn(iqmp_data, sizeof(iqmp_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, n))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, e))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, d))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1,
+ p))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2,
+ q))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_FROM_PQ, 1))
+ || !TEST_ptr(fromdata_params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld)))
+ goto err;
+
+ cdata[0].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT1;
+ cdata[0].comparebn = dmp1;
+ cdata[1].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT2;
+ cdata[1].comparebn = dmq1;
+ cdata[2].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT1;
+ cdata[2].comparebn = iqmp;
+ cdata[3].pname = NULL;
+ cdata[3].comparebn = NULL;
+
+ ret = do_fromdata_rsa_derive(fromdata_params, cdata, 512, 56, 64);
+
+err:
+ BN_free(n);
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(q);
+ BN_free(dmp1);
+ BN_free(dmq1);
+ BN_free(iqmp);
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_fromdata_rsa_derive_from_pq_multiprime(void)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *p2 = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *exp3 = NULL, *coeff2 = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM *fromdata_params = NULL;
+ struct check_data cdata[12];
+ int ret = 0;
+ /*
+ * multiprime RSA key, extracted from this command,
+ * openssl genrsa -primes 3 | openssl rsa -text
+ * Note: When generating a key with EVP_PKEY_fromdata, and using
+ * crt derivation, openssl requires a minimum of 512 bits of n data,
+ * and 2048 bits in the FIPS case
+ */
+ static unsigned char n_data[] =
+ {0x00, 0x95, 0x78, 0x21, 0xe0, 0xca, 0x94, 0x6c, 0x0b, 0x86, 0x2a, 0x01,
+ 0xde, 0xd9, 0xab, 0xee, 0x88, 0x4a, 0x27, 0x4f, 0xcc, 0x5f, 0xf1, 0x71,
+ 0xe1, 0x0b, 0xc3, 0xd1, 0x88, 0x76, 0xf0, 0x83, 0x03, 0x93, 0x7e, 0x39,
+ 0xfa, 0x47, 0x89, 0x34, 0x27, 0x18, 0x19, 0x97, 0xfc, 0xd4, 0xfe, 0xe5,
+ 0x8a, 0xa9, 0x11, 0x83, 0xb5, 0x15, 0x4a, 0x29, 0xa6, 0xa6, 0xd0, 0x6e,
+ 0x0c, 0x7f, 0x61, 0x8f, 0x7e, 0x7c, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x04, 0x8b, 0xca, 0x44,
+ 0xf8, 0x59, 0x0b, 0x22, 0x6f, 0x3f, 0x92, 0x23, 0x98, 0xb5, 0xc8, 0xf7,
+ 0xff, 0xf7, 0xac, 0x6b, 0x36, 0xb3, 0xaf, 0x39, 0xde, 0x66, 0x38, 0x51,
+ 0x9f, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0xe4, 0x6f, 0x1a, 0x0f, 0x7a, 0xde, 0x7f, 0x0f,
+ 0x4e, 0xbc, 0xed, 0xa2, 0x99, 0xc5, 0xd1, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0xba, 0x92, 0x91,
+ 0xe4, 0x00, 0x91, 0xbb, 0x67, 0x36, 0x7d, 0x00, 0x50, 0xda, 0x28, 0x38,
+ 0xdc, 0x9f, 0xfe, 0x3f, 0x24, 0x5a, 0x0d, 0xe1, 0x8d, 0xe9, 0x45, 0x2c,
+ 0xd7, 0xf2, 0x67, 0x8c, 0x0c, 0x6e, 0xdb, 0xc8, 0x8b, 0x6b, 0x38, 0x30,
+ 0x21, 0x94, 0xc0, 0xe3, 0xd7, 0xe0, 0x23, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xfa, 0xdb, 0xb9,
+ 0xfe, 0x1a, 0xcc, 0xc9, 0x79, 0x19, 0x35, 0x18, 0x42, 0x30, 0xc4, 0xb5,
+ 0x92, 0x33, 0x1e, 0xd4, 0xc4, 0xc0, 0x9d, 0x55, 0x37, 0xd4, 0xef, 0x54,
+ 0x71, 0x81, 0x09, 0x15, 0xdb, 0x11, 0x38, 0x6b, 0x35, 0x93, 0x11, 0xdc,
+ 0xb1, 0x6c, 0xd6, 0xa4, 0x37, 0x84, 0xf3, 0xb2, 0x2f, 0x1b, 0xd6, 0x05,
+ 0x9f, 0x0e, 0x5c, 0x98, 0x29, 0x2f, 0x95, 0xb6, 0x55, 0xbd, 0x24, 0x44,
+ 0xc5, 0xc8, 0xa2, 0x76, 0x1e, 0xf8, 0x82, 0x8a, 0xdf, 0x34, 0x72, 0x7e,
+ 0xdd, 0x65, 0x4b, 0xfc, 0x6c, 0x1c, 0x96, 0x70, 0xe2, 0x69, 0xb5, 0x12,
+ 0x1b, 0x59, 0x67, 0x14, 0x9d};
+ static unsigned char e_data[] = {0x01, 0x00, 0x01};
+ static unsigned char d_data[] =
+ {0x64, 0x57, 0x4d, 0x86, 0xf6, 0xf8, 0x44, 0xc0, 0x47, 0xc5, 0x13, 0x94,
+ 0x63, 0x54, 0x84, 0xc1, 0x81, 0xe6, 0x7a, 0x2f, 0x9d, 0x89, 0x1d, 0x06,
+ 0x13, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0x02, 0x62, 0xb6, 0x7b, 0x7d, 0x7f, 0x1a, 0x92, 0x19,
+ 0x6e, 0xc4, 0xb0, 0xfa, 0x3d, 0xb7, 0x90, 0xcc, 0xee, 0xc0, 0x5f, 0xa0,
+ 0x82, 0x77, 0x7b, 0x8f, 0xa9, 0x47, 0x2c, 0x46, 0xf0, 0x5d, 0xa4, 0x43,
+ 0x47, 0x90, 0x5b, 0x20, 0x73, 0x0f, 0x46, 0xd4, 0x56, 0x73, 0xe7, 0x71,
+ 0x41, 0x75, 0xb4, 0x1c, 0x32, 0xf5, 0x0c, 0x68, 0x8c, 0x40, 0xea, 0x1c,
+ 0x30, 0x12, 0xa2, 0x65, 0x02, 0x27, 0x98, 0x4e, 0x0a, 0xbf, 0x2b, 0x72,
+ 0xb2, 0x5c, 0xe3, 0xbe, 0x3e, 0xc7, 0xdb, 0x9b, 0xa2, 0x4a, 0x90, 0xc0,
+ 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x00, 0xf1, 0x6a, 0xff, 0xa3, 0x77, 0xf7, 0x71, 0xa2, 0x41,
+ 0xe9, 0x6e, 0x7c, 0x38, 0x24, 0x46, 0xd5, 0x5c, 0x49, 0x2a, 0xe6, 0xee,
+ 0x27, 0x4b, 0x2e, 0x6f, 0x16, 0x54, 0x2d, 0x37, 0x36, 0x01, 0x39, 0x2b,
+ 0x23, 0x4b, 0xb4, 0x65, 0x25, 0x4d, 0x7f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x7f, 0x5d, 0xec,
+ 0x50, 0xba, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x9c, 0x3c, 0x1d, 0xa1, 0x40, 0x2c, 0x6a, 0x8b,
+ 0x5f, 0x2e, 0xe0, 0xa6, 0xf7, 0x9e, 0x03, 0xb5, 0x44, 0x5f, 0x74, 0xc7,
+ 0x9f, 0x89, 0x2b, 0x71, 0x2f, 0x66, 0x9f, 0x03, 0x6c, 0x96, 0xd0, 0x23,
+ 0x36, 0x4d, 0xa1, 0xf0, 0x82, 0xcc, 0x43, 0xe7, 0x08, 0x93, 0x40, 0x18,
+ 0xc0, 0x39, 0x73, 0x83, 0xe2, 0xec, 0x9b, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x4c, 0x86, 0xaa,
+ 0x59, 0xa8, 0x67, 0x1c, 0x80, 0xdc, 0x6f, 0x7f, 0x23, 0x6b, 0x7d, 0x2c,
+ 0x56, 0x99, 0xa0, 0x89, 0x7e, 0xdb, 0x8b, 0x7a, 0xaa, 0x03, 0x8e, 0x8e,
+ 0x8e, 0x3a, 0x58, 0xb4, 0x03, 0x6b, 0x65, 0xfa, 0x92, 0x0a, 0x96, 0x93,
+ 0xa6, 0x07, 0x60, 0x01};
+ static unsigned char p_data[] =
+ {0x06, 0x55, 0x7f, 0xbd, 0xfd, 0xa8, 0x4c, 0x94, 0x5e, 0x10, 0x8a, 0x54,
+ 0x37, 0xf3, 0x64, 0x37, 0x3a, 0xca, 0x18, 0x1b, 0xdd, 0x71, 0xa5, 0x94,
+ 0xc9, 0x31, 0x59, 0xa5, 0x89, 0xe9, 0xc4, 0xba, 0x55, 0x90, 0x6d, 0x9c,
+ 0xcc, 0x52, 0x5d, 0x44, 0xa8, 0xbc, 0x2b, 0x3b, 0x8c, 0xbd, 0x96, 0xfa,
+ 0xcd, 0x54, 0x63, 0xe3, 0xc8, 0xfe, 0x5e, 0xc6, 0x73, 0x98, 0x14, 0x7a,
+ 0x54, 0x0e, 0xe7, 0x75, 0x49, 0x93, 0x20, 0x33, 0x17, 0xa9, 0x34, 0xa8,
+ 0xee, 0xaf, 0x3a, 0xcc, 0xf5, 0x69, 0xfc, 0x30, 0x1a, 0xdf, 0x49, 0x61,
+ 0xa4, 0xd1};
+ static unsigned char p2_data[] =
+ {0x03, 0xe2, 0x41, 0x3d, 0xb1, 0xdd, 0xad, 0xd7, 0x3b, 0xf8, 0xab, 0x32,
+ 0x27, 0x8b, 0xac, 0x95, 0xc0, 0x1a, 0x3f, 0x80, 0x8e, 0x21, 0xa9, 0xb8,
+ 0xa2, 0xed, 0xcf, 0x97, 0x5c, 0x61, 0x10, 0x94, 0x1b, 0xd0, 0xbe, 0x88,
+ 0xc2, 0xa7, 0x20, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0xc2, 0x7a, 0x7e, 0xf0, 0xd1, 0xe4, 0x13,
+ 0x75, 0xb9, 0x62, 0x90, 0xf1, 0xc3, 0x5b, 0x8c, 0xe9, 0xa9, 0x5b, 0xb7,
+ 0x6d, 0xdc, 0xcd, 0x12, 0xea, 0x97, 0x05, 0x04, 0x25, 0x2a, 0x93, 0xd1,
+ 0x4e, 0x05, 0x1a, 0x50, 0xa2, 0x67, 0xb8, 0x4b, 0x09, 0x15, 0x65, 0x6c,
+ 0x66, 0x2d};
+ static unsigned char q_data[] =
+ {0x06, 0x13, 0x74, 0x6e, 0xde, 0x7c, 0x33, 0xc2, 0xe7, 0x05, 0x2c, 0xeb,
+ 0x25, 0x7d, 0x4a, 0x07, 0x7e, 0x03, 0xcf, 0x6a, 0x23, 0x36, 0x25, 0x23,
+ 0xf6, 0x5d, 0xde, 0xa3, 0x0f, 0x82, 0xe6, 0x4b, 0xec, 0x39, 0xbf, 0x37,
+ 0x1f, 0x4f, 0x56, 0x1e, 0xd8, 0x62, 0x32, 0x5c, 0xf5, 0x37, 0x75, 0x20,
+ 0xe2, 0x7e, 0x56, 0x82, 0xc6, 0x35, 0xd3, 0x4d, 0xfa, 0x6c, 0xc3, 0x93,
+ 0xf0, 0x60, 0x53, 0x78, 0x95, 0xee, 0xf9, 0x8b, 0x2c, 0xaf, 0xb1, 0x47,
+ 0x5c, 0x29, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x7f, 0xd0, 0x7a, 0x4e, 0x26, 0x7b, 0x47,
+ 0xfb, 0x61};
+ static unsigned char dmp1_data[] =
+ {0x01, 0x13, 0x3a, 0x1f, 0x91, 0x92, 0xa3, 0x8c, 0xfb, 0x7a, 0x6b, 0x40,
+ 0x68, 0x4e, 0xd3, 0xcf, 0xdc, 0x16, 0xb9, 0x88, 0xe1, 0x49, 0x8d, 0x05,
+ 0x78, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x3a, 0x70, 0xf2, 0x51, 0x06, 0x1f, 0xc7, 0xe8, 0x13,
+ 0x19, 0x4b, 0x51, 0xb1, 0x79, 0xc2, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x00, 0xdb, 0x9d, 0x68,
+ 0xec, 0xb9, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x3b, 0xae, 0x91, 0x7f, 0xb5, 0xd7, 0x36, 0x82,
+ 0x9d, 0x09, 0xfa, 0x97, 0x99, 0xe9, 0x73, 0x29, 0xb8, 0xf6, 0x6b, 0x8d,
+ 0xd1, 0x15, 0xc5, 0x31, 0x4c, 0xe6, 0xb4, 0x7b, 0xa5, 0xd4, 0x08, 0xac,
+ 0x9e, 0x41};
+ static unsigned char dmq1_data[] =
+ {0x05, 0xcd, 0x33, 0xc2, 0xdd, 0x3b, 0xb8, 0xec, 0xe4, 0x4c, 0x03, 0xcc,
+ 0xef, 0xba, 0x07, 0x22, 0xca, 0x47, 0x77, 0x18, 0x40, 0x50, 0xe5, 0xfb,
+ 0xc5, 0xb5, 0x71, 0xed, 0x3e, 0xd5, 0x5d, 0x72, 0xa7, 0x37, 0xa8, 0x86,
+ 0x48, 0xa6, 0x27, 0x74, 0x42, 0x66, 0xd8, 0xf1, 0xfb, 0xcf, 0x1d, 0x4e,
+ 0xee, 0x15, 0x76, 0x23, 0x5e, 0x81, 0x6c, 0xa7, 0x2b, 0x74, 0x08, 0xf7,
+ 0x4c, 0x71, 0x9d, 0xa2, 0x29, 0x7f, 0xca, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x31, 0x2c, 0x54,
+ 0x18, 0x02, 0xb6, 0xa8, 0x65, 0x26, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0x9b, 0x80, 0x90, 0xfc,
+ 0x75, 0x61};
+ static unsigned char iqmp_data[] =
+ {0x05, 0x78, 0xf8, 0xdd, 0x1c, 0x6f, 0x3d, 0xaf, 0x53, 0x84, 0x32, 0xa9,
+ 0x35, 0x52, 0xf3, 0xd0, 0x4d, 0xf8, 0x09, 0x85, 0x3d, 0x72, 0x20, 0x8b,
+ 0x47, 0xba, 0xc8, 0xce, 0xac, 0xd9, 0x76, 0x90, 0x05, 0x88, 0x63, 0x8a,
+ 0x10, 0x2b, 0xcd, 0xd3, 0xbe, 0x8c, 0x16, 0x60, 0x6a, 0xfd, 0xce, 0xc7,
+ 0x9f, 0xfa, 0xbb, 0xe3, 0xa6, 0xde, 0xc2, 0x8f, 0x1d, 0x25, 0xdc, 0x41,
+ 0xcb, 0xa4, 0xeb, 0x76, 0xc9, 0xdc, 0x8e, 0x49, 0x0e, 0xe4, 0x7c, 0xd2,
+ 0xd5, 0x6e, 0x26, 0x3c, 0x0b, 0xd3, 0xc5, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x4b, 0xb6, 0xf7,
+ 0xae, 0xef};
+ static unsigned char exp3_data[] =
+ {0x02, 0x7d, 0x16, 0x24, 0xfc, 0x35, 0xf9, 0xd0, 0xb3, 0x02, 0xf2, 0x5f,
+ 0xde, 0xeb, 0x27, 0x19, 0x85, 0xd0, 0xcb, 0xe4, 0x0a, 0x2f, 0x13, 0xdb,
+ 0xd5, 0xba, 0xe0, 0x8c, 0x32, 0x8b, 0x97, 0xdd, 0xef, 0xbc, 0xe0, 0x7a,
+ 0x2d, 0x90, 0x7e, 0x09, 0xe9, 0x1f, 0x26, 0xf2, 0xf4, 0x48, 0xea, 0x06,
+ 0x76, 0x26, 0xe6, 0x3b, 0xce, 0x4e, 0xc9, 0xf9, 0x0f, 0x38, 0x90, 0x26,
+ 0x87, 0x65, 0x36, 0x9a, 0xea, 0x6a, 0xfe, 0xb1, 0xdb, 0x46, 0xdf, 0x14,
+ 0xfd, 0x13, 0x53, 0xfb, 0x5b, 0x35, 0x6e, 0xe7, 0xd5, 0xd8, 0x39, 0xf7,
+ 0x2d, 0xb9};
+ static unsigned char coeff2_data[] =
+ {0x01, 0xba, 0x66, 0x0a, 0xa2, 0x86, 0xc0, 0x57, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x68, 0xb1,
+ 0x86, 0x63, 0x23, 0x5b, 0x0e, 0xeb, 0x93, 0x42, 0xd1, 0xaa, 0x15, 0x13,
+ 0xcc, 0x29, 0x71, 0x8a, 0xb0, 0xe0, 0xc9, 0x67, 0xde, 0x1a, 0x7c, 0x1a,
+ 0xef, 0xa7, 0x08, 0x85, 0xb3, 0xae, 0x98, 0x99, 0xde, 0xaf, 0x09, 0x38,
+ 0xfc, 0x46, 0x29, 0x5f, 0x4f, 0x7e, 0x01, 0x6c, 0x50, 0x13, 0x95, 0x91,
+ 0x4c, 0x0f, 0x00, 0xba, 0xca, 0x40, 0xa3, 0xd0, 0x58, 0xb6, 0x62, 0x4c,
+ 0xd1, 0xb6, 0xd3, 0x29, 0x5d, 0x82, 0xb3, 0x3d, 0x61, 0xbe, 0x5d, 0xf0,
+ 0x4b, 0xf4};
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new())
+ || !TEST_ptr(n = BN_bin2bn(n_data, sizeof(n_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(e = BN_bin2bn(e_data, sizeof(e_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(d = BN_bin2bn(d_data, sizeof(d_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(p = BN_bin2bn(p_data, sizeof(p_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(q = BN_bin2bn(q_data, sizeof(q_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(p2 = BN_bin2bn(p2_data, sizeof(p2_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(exp3 = BN_bin2bn(exp3_data, sizeof(exp3_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(coeff2 = BN_bin2bn(coeff2_data, sizeof(coeff2_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(dmp1 = BN_bin2bn(dmp1_data, sizeof(dmp1_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(dmq1 = BN_bin2bn(dmq1_data, sizeof(dmq1_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_ptr(iqmp = BN_bin2bn(iqmp_data, sizeof(iqmp_data), NULL))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, n))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, e))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, d))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1,
+ p))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2,
+ q))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR3,
+ p2))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_FROM_PQ, 1))
+ || !TEST_ptr(fromdata_params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld)))
+ goto err;
+
+ cdata[0].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT1;
+ cdata[0].comparebn = dmp1;
+ cdata[1].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT2;
+ cdata[1].comparebn = dmq1;
+ cdata[2].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT1;
+ cdata[2].comparebn = iqmp;
+ cdata[3].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT3;
+ cdata[3].comparebn = exp3;
+ cdata[4].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT2;
+ cdata[4].comparebn = coeff2;
+ cdata[5].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N;
+ cdata[5].comparebn = n;
+ cdata[6].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E;
+ cdata[6].comparebn = e;
+ cdata[7].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D;
+ cdata[7].comparebn = d;
+ cdata[8].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1;
+ cdata[8].comparebn = p;
+ cdata[9].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2;
+ cdata[9].comparebn = q;
+ cdata[10].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR3;
+ cdata[10].comparebn = p2;
+ cdata[11].pname = NULL;
+ cdata[11].comparebn = NULL;
+
+ ret = do_fromdata_rsa_derive(fromdata_params, cdata, 2048, 112, 256);
+
+err:
+ BN_free(n);
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(p2);
+ BN_free(q);
+ BN_free(dmp1);
+ BN_free(dmq1);
+ BN_free(iqmp);
+ BN_free(exp3);
+ BN_free(coeff2);
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int test_evp_pkey_get_bn_param_large(void)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -459,7 +851,7 @@ static int test_evp_pkey_get_bn_param_large(void)
static const unsigned char e_data[] = {
0x1, 0x00, 0x01
};
- static const unsigned char d_data[]= {
+ static const unsigned char d_data[] = {
0x99, 0x33, 0x13, 0x7b
};
@@ -1765,6 +2157,8 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST(test_evp_pkey_ctx_dup_kdf);
ADD_TEST(test_evp_pkey_get_bn_param_large);
ADD_TEST(test_fromdata_rsa);
+ ADD_TEST(test_fromdata_rsa_derive_from_pq_sp800);
+ ADD_TEST(test_fromdata_rsa_derive_from_pq_multiprime);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
ADD_TEST(test_fromdata_dh_fips186_4);
ADD_TEST(test_fromdata_dh_named_group);
diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
index c37ed7815f..df93202d1d 100644
--- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -348,6 +348,7 @@ my %params = (
'PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC' => '*PKEY_PARAM_MASKGENFUNC',
'PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST' => '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST',
'PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN' => "saltlen",
+ 'PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_FROM_PQ' => "rsa-derive-from-pq",
# EC, X25519 and X448 Key generation parameters
'PKEY_PARAM_DHKEM_IKM' => "dhkem-ikm",
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2025-01-30 20:38:10 +0100